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I. INTRODUCTION
A butterfly straddle is an investment hedging structure which, if
perfectly executed and transaction cost free, enables the investor to
end up at some later point in time in exactly the same situation as he
or she started out in.1 The legal treatment of stock options in the con-
text of formulating child support awards has all the hallmarks of a
1. The strategy is used in the context of tax planning. In theory the investor can
shift current tax obligations into a subsequent year indefinitely. Needless to say
it is a device which the Internal Revenue Service frowns upon, and its use rou-
tinely is disallowed if the principal goal behind the scheme is tax avoidance.
However, at times, the butterfly straddle may constitute a legitimate hedging
strategy. The following extracts from cases may be of assistance:
A single position calling for the purchase or the sale of a designated com-
modity is described as an "open contract." However, if the same person
acquires a position calling for the purchase of a specified commodity and
a different position calling for the sale of the same commodity, his posi-
tion is described as a straddle and each of such positions is referred to as
a "leg" of the straddle ..... Whenever an open position is held, price
changes in the commodity future directly affect the economic position of
the holder. By contrast, in a straddle, the holder is economically affected
only by changes in the spread, i.e., the difference between the market
price of each leg of the straddle. If the prices of the short and long legs of
the straddle move exactly in tandem so that the spread does not change,
the holder will suffer no economic consequence since his unrealized loss
in one leg will be offset by his unrealized gain in the other. However, if
the spread widens or narrows, the holder will incur either an economic
gain or loss ..... Whenever a leg of a straddle is closed out by the
purchase of an exactly opposite position, or in any other manner, tax
consequences normally will result to the holder in either a realized gain
or loss. In such a case, where the straddle consists of only two positions,
that position which is not closed out becomes simply an open contract.
As a general rule in tax-motivated straddle trading, the loss leg will be
closed out first in order to generate a tax loss for the holder. When this
occurs, the remaining leg of the initial straddle containing an unrealized
gain, which is usually almost identical to the amount of loss in the closed
leg, constitutes an open position for the holder, and as such, is subject to
the increased risk of being directly affected by the market. To minimize
this risk, the holder would be expected to obtain a new position similar
to the one in the closed loss leg except for a different month. This substi-
tution of one position for a similar position in a different month (switch-
ing) of the loss leg in the initial year in order to generate a tax loss which
is offset by the unrealized gain in the other leg of the straddle is a pat-
tern usually found in the trading of tax straddles. Straddle transactions
having as their principal objective "deferrals" (postponing to a later year
an already realized gain in an unrelated transaction) or "conversions"
(changing a short-term capital gain on an unrelated transaction to a
long-term capital gain) are commonly referred to as "tax straddles" in
the industry. A "butterfly straddle" is a straddle consisting of at least
three legs. It is essentially a combination of two straddles that, when
drawn schematically, resembles a butterfly. For example, the following
would be a butterfly straddle with four legs:
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jurisprudential attempt at a butterfly straddle. On the surface, the
courts appear to apply a conventional analysis to determine the sup-
port obligation. However, anything more than a superficial analysis
suggests that by and large the goal is to move the litigation along,
while as far as possible allowing the jurisprudence to remain in the
same situation it started out in, that is, without having to come to
grips with the fundamental financial and legal characteristics of stock
options. The result is that where reliance is placed upon "income"
from stock options, any analysis underpinning the award of child sup-
port frequently tends to be flawed in one or more respects.
It would seem self-evident that a goal of a child support order is to
provide support for a child. Behind this goal lies a broad and tangled
spectrum of objectives.2 The purpose of the present Article is to ex-
amine the relationship between the achievement of these objectives
and judicial efforts to make child support orders where a significant
component of the resources used to determine the size of the award is
in the form of stock options. The analysis is complicated by the fact
that stock options are themselves inherently complex instruments.
This complexity leads to a variety of problems. For example, it is diffi-
cult to characterize the role options play in a family's domestic econ-
omy. In turn, this leads to an inability to assign to options a
convenient analytical paradigm such as "asset" or "income."3 This,
coupled with the technical character of options, makes it problematic
The middle position or 'body" of a butterfly straddle is exactly twice the
size of each outside position or "wing." In a butterfly straddle, each
straddle is traded separately ....
Ewing v. Comm'r, 91 T.C. 396, 400-01 (1988).
In a perfect butterfly straddle, the number of contracts involved in each
wing will be one-half of the number of contracts involved in the body ....
A switch or rollover occurs when one leg of the straddle is closed out and
is replaced by a new leg so that the straddle position is maintained.
Whenever a switch occurs, tax consequences normally will result: either
a realized gain or loss on the leg which is closed out. Thus, one can pro-
duce a loss for tax purposes by establishing a straddle and waiting for
some movement in the price of the legs. Because the straddle trader has
both a long position and a short position, fluctuation in the price of the
underlying commodity typically will result in a gain in one leg and a loss
in the other. The losing leg can then be closed out, recognizing the loss,
and it can then be replaced with a similar position, at a new but lower
cost, so that the risk of the overall position remains essentially the same.
The gain on the other leg, of course, will eventually have to be recog-
nized, but this can be deferred until a later year.
Perlin v. Comm'r, 86 T.C. 388, 392-93 (1986).
2. The American Law Institute, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3,04 (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES] sets out
several of these objectives. Those themes, and others, will be returned to in detail
in due course.
3. This problem also arises in divorce in the context of the property division claim
between spouses. See David S. Rosettenstein, The ALI Proposals and the Distri-
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to identify a monetary amount to be attributed to the options for the
purposes of calculating child support. This process, in turn, occurs in
a context where it becomes necessary understand whether, in reality,
value ever will be able to be extracted from the option, or indeed, even
if value can be extracted, whether it is appropriate to do so at any
particular moment in time.
The Article commences with a brief overview of the objectives that
can underpin a child support obligation. For this purpose, the Article
will rely heavily on the analysis contained in the American Law Insti-
tute's "Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,"4 which reflect the
vast majority of themes found scattered in buckshot fashion through
the jurisprudence of the various states. This is followed by to a simi-
larly brief look at aspects of the conceptual underpinnings of the for-
mulae used to calculate child support, again relying very heavily on
the Principles. This leads to a consideration of the resources, actual or
imputed, which may be looked to in order to determine the amount of
any award and to satisfy the obligation. No effort is made to be com-
prehensive. Rather, the goal is to reflect the pressures and considera-
tions that may come to bear on a child support determination in the
context of a family's domestic economy where options are present-in
particular as these considerations impact the triangulated tensions of
the interests of the child and those of the parents inter se.
The Article then turns to the nature of options and how the charac-
teristics of options tend to generate confusion when it comes to relying
on options to provide "income" in formulating a child support award.
In particular, the Article considers issues like the potentially pro-
tracted vesting period of option, the purpose behind the grant and the
vesting period, the ability to defer the benefit, the varied and often-
times inappropriate techniques used to value options, and the impact
of these techniques, illiquidity issues and other problems associated
with actually extracting any nominal value from the options.
The next Part of the Article considers the decided cases as they
grapple with the theoretical and practical concerns just outlined. The
treatment emerges as somewhat fragmentary, in part precisely be-
cause jurisdictions have been unable, or unwilling, to attempt to de-
velop a comprehensive jurisprudence in the area.
The final Part of the Article attempts, with some broad brush
strokes, to suggest considerations which might reduce the risk of judi-
cial treatments that are theoretically untenable or which produce re-
sults which are inappropriate or unrealistic.
bution of Stock Options and Restricted Stock on Divorce: The Risks of Theory Meet
the Theory of Risk, 8 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 243, 282-91 (2002).
4. Supra note 2.
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II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
The American Law Institute (ALI) Principles (hereinafter the
"Principles" or "ALI"), inter alia, consider that a child support order
should seek to ensure that each child has a minimum decent standard
of living, and a standard of living that is not grossly inferior to that of
either parent, while ensuring that the child does not suffer a loss of
important life opportunities that the parents are able to provide with-
out undue hardship to themselves or their other dependents. Also,
both residential and non-residential parents are to be treated fairly
and the rules should not discourage the labor force participation of
either parent and should take into account the child's need for care.
The rules should reflect popular understanding of the duties of par-
ents to the child and to each other.5 The Principles also consider the
administrative ramifications of any child support order and suggest
that the rule should be readily comprehensible, and that awards
should be enforceable and modifiable as the circumstances of the par-
ties change and that the design and implementation of the rules
should minimize conflict between the parents. 6
A. Interests
The Principles acknowledge that the considerations that can be
brought to bear on the issue of child support reflect competing values
and interests. The entities with interests to be advanced are society,
the child, the residential parent, and the non-residential parent.7
From society's point of view, beyond the issue of avoiding having the
child as a public charge, there is the need to advance the welfare of the
next generation of citizens by providing for its care, nutrition and edu-
cation.8 From the child's perspective, ideally, he or she should emerge
from the divorce economically unharmed. Ordinarily, this is not going
to be possible as the fragmentation of a common household leads to
economic inefficiencies. Accordingly, unless it is desired to relatively
disadvantage the non-residential parent, to compensate for these inef-
ficiencies the most any award scheme can plan to achieve, in the ab-
sence of a surplus of resources, is that the child's economic interests do
not suffer disproportionately to those of other family members. 9 The
Principles also acknowledge that, beyond a consumption based analy-
sis, the child can lay claim to support for life opportunities, primarily
education, when the parents can afford to provide them.1O
5. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.04b(1)-(7).
6. Id. § 3.04(7)-(9).
7. Id. § 3.04 cmts. a-f.
8. Id. § 3.04 cmt. b.
9. Id. § 3.04 cmt. c.
10. Id. § 3.04 cmt. c(ii).
2004]
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One or other of the parents may have a relatively higher income.
The Principles accept the proposition that such a parent has a legiti-
mate interest in retaining the fruits of his or her labors, which the
Principles accept translates into a proposition that that parent is enti-
tled to enjoy a relatively higher standard of living. In the ALI's view,
this perspective enjoys "considerable, although not unanimous, sup-
port in American culture" and is implicitly incorporated into all ex-
isting child and spousal support rules.i" But, precisely how much
better off the advantaged parent is entitled to be emerges as the con-
sequence of balancing the competing interests impacting child support
awards. Unlike the ALI's formulaic approach when it comes to prop-
erty division and compensatory awards,i 2 there is no objectively quan-
tifiable safe harbor for post-divorce surplus wealth in the child
support arena.
When it comes to the residential parent's interests, these primarily
seek to ensure that this parent does not carry a disproportionate share
of the out of pocket costs of rearing the child. Additionally, this parent
should not suffer a relative financial disadvantage in terms of the op-
portunity costs suffered by assuming residential responsibility.13
These interests tie in with an interest to maximize this parent's labor
force participation, to the extent that this is consistent with the child's
needs. 14
The law long ago rejected the notion that the non-residential par-
ent has no obligations towards the residential household. However,
that obligation is reflected in the duty to pay child support. At its
simplest, it could be argued that the non-residential parent's interest,
as such, is contributing no-more than he or she would have contrib-
uted to support the child in an intact two parent household. 15 How-
ever, this amount, as the Principles point out, does not hold the child
harmless, prevent unequal suffering, or guarantee a minimum stan-
dard of living. On the other hand this measure does tend to ensure
11. Id. § 3.04 cmt. d.
12. See generally id. §§ 4.09, 5.01.
13. This issue is confronted routinely in the area of family law. However, the analy-
sis is somewhat awkward since the proposition itself assumes that the financial
detriment is suffered on an "involuntary" basis. If this is not the case, then the
child care function embodies some element of opportunity exploitation which is
not factored into the financial analysis. A search for simplicity would support
this oversight, but simple solutions are not necessarily just solutions.
14. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.04 cmt. e.
15. Actually, as the Reporter's Notes to the Principles makes clear, the idea that the
non-residential parent should be no worse off following payment of child support
may mean no more than that his or her standard of living should not decline,
even if he or she is paying more than previously. At least the Reporter suggests
that this can be used as a benchmark of what is just. It does not imply that
household living standards should necessarily be equalized. Id. § 3.04, Reporter's
Notes, cmt. f.
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that the reach of the benefit extends no further than the child. The
ALI accepts that a non-residential parent has a legitimate interest in
limiting his or her obligation to the extent of the parent's relationship
with the child rather than as reflecting an obligation to the residential
household, even though the household may benefit indirectly from
benefits conferred on the child.16 Despite this restricted conceptual-
ization of the obligation, the Principles recognize that the non-residen-
tial parent's interests in this regard may be overridden by other child
welfare objectives, 17 as well as by the residential parent's interest in
not bearing a disproportionate share of the costs of residential respon-
sibility.1 8 Where the non-residential parent's resources are relatively
sparse, the ALI accepts that this parent's obligation should not cause
disproportionate suffering to the payor. 19
Finally, the Principles note that they are unwilling to recognize a
residential parent's losses in the form of leisure foregone, or in the
acceptance of onerous responsibility. Neither is this group of parents
credited with the benefits of enhanced relational opportunities with
the child and correspondingly the non-residential payors receive no
adjustment for any corresponding detriment. Finally, the potential
impact on an opportunity to remarry due to child-rearing or the obli-
gation to pay child support is not factored into the ALI's scheme. 2 0
In due course we will return to these broad brush stroke interest
descriptions as we observe the courts, often unknowingly, gloss the
analysis as they seek to justify the extraction of support from stock
option awards. For the moment, however, we turn to the ALI's analy-
sis of the appropriate objectives to be achieved within this umbrella of
interests.
B. Objectives
The ALI position seeks to avoid a gross disparity between the eco-
nomic circumstances of the child and a non-residential parent with an
income that is higher than that of the residential parent. Neverthe-
less, it disavows any attempt to equalize the standard of living of the
two households in such a circumstance 2 1 That said, the Principles ac-
knowledge that custody almost always ends up in the hands of the
historical primary caretaker. This individual potentially has suffered
economic detriment in terms of the non-acquisition of market skills
and experience, and will probably continue to do so by virtue of the
custodial role assumed on divorce. The Principles accept that the his-
16. Id. § 3.04 cmt. f.
17. See supra text accompanying note 6-10.
18. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.04 cmt. f.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 3.04 cmt. g.
21. Id. § 3.04 cmt. i.
2004]
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torical injury should be remedied in adjustments between the adults
pursuant to the divorce, but that it may be necessary to address
through child support any disparity in the child's post-divorce stan-
dard of living flowing from the handicapping of the custodial parent's
earning capacity. 2 2
Additionally, the Principles seek to ensure that the child does not
lose important life opportunities that the parents are able to provide
without undue hardships to themselves or other dependents. 23 This
consideration is likely to be of some significance in households whose
support base includes stock options given where the option holders
may well lie at the higher end of the income spectrum. In this regard,
it is interesting to note that the ALI proposals seem to be structured
somewhat narrowly. The primary objective is to advance the child
and society's interests by trying to require that the parents continue
to spend on the child's education and training what would have been
spent if the family was intact, on the premise that a parent may under
invest in the education of a child with whom he or she does not share a
household. 24 Beyond conventional educational opportunities the Prin-
ciples contemplate musical, artistic or athletic training for a child with
unusual gifts,25 that is, specialized education and training appropri-
ate to the child's special talents and abilities. 26 Further, the Princi-
ples indicate that while they specifically mention education as a
component of the life opportunities to be supported, the concept should
"not be limited to" the educational and training concerns specifically
articulated in the Principles. 27 Given the notion that all of life's ex-
periences are in some sense educational, it would not be too surprising
to see an analysis such as this stretched to near breaking-point by a
court seeking to engage in inter-household wealth transfer.2 8 There is
certain to be some point when the process becomes hard to reconcile
with those objectives which disavow an intention to require that the
non-custodial parent share earnings to the point of equalizing the
standards of living of the households. And, this is apart from whether
the process is consistent with any analytic baseline that the payor's
22. Id. Since the transfer flowing from such an analysis involves funds, not facts, it
is hard to avoid an argument that the process involves a continuing post-divorce
incremental wealth "top-up". After all, the measure is what the residential par-
ent would have been able to contribute and not directly what the child's needs
are. Potentially, there is a significant opportunity for judicial speculation here.
23. Id. §§ 3.04 cmt. j, 3.12(1).
24. Id. § 3.12 cmt. a.
25. See id.
26. Id. § 3.12(2)(c).
27. Id. § 3.12(2).
28. The comments specifically provide that life opportunities may also include, for
example, summer camps, cultural travel and support during nonpaying or low-
paying apprenticeships. Id. § 3.12 cmt. a.
[Vol. 82:947
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contribution should be no more than what the payor would have con-
tributed if he or she was sharing a household with the child.29
The ALI's objectives also include the goal of not discouraging the
labor force participation of either parent.30 As far as payors are con-
cerned, the analysis seems to accept, somewhat optimistically per-
haps, that the payor's incentive continues so long as the payor's net
benefit stays in the black.31 On the payee's side, the system cannot
afford to allow the payee to not participate in the labor market and
expect the resulting deficiency to made up in the form of child support.
This would be the result if the scheme simply sought to ensure equal
29. See id. § 3.04 cmt. f. Indeed, the Principles seem to recognize that the court could
find itself in a situation of resources which exceed the demands that legitimately
can be imposed on the resources under the Principles. Thus, the court is specifi-
cally empowered to order funds placed in trust to provide for the child's future
opportunities. Id. at § 3.12(4). Then, and at least superficially somewhat confus-
ingly, the Principles specify that if the support obligation of high-income support
obligor exceeds the amount required to comfortably support the child in a manner
not grossly inferior to the obligor's standard of living, the court may require the
obligor to place the excess in trust to provide for the child's future life opportuni-
ties. Id. § 3.12(5). The Comments provide a gloss to the effect that the initial
provision reflects the idea that parents save for education of their children, but
that this demand can be imposed upon them in addition to their conventional
support obligations. Hence, apparently, the provision allows the court to impose
this obligation on a "parent," not just an "obligor." The follow-up provision in
contrast deals with the situation where the "obligor's" Principle-dictated payment
cannot reasonably be used immediately. Here, the court can authorize any sur-
plus to be deposited into a trust to cover future life opportunities. A provision
such as this can have substantial utility in the context of an income stream
grounded on stock options where the future availability of resources may be unre-
liable, and funds generated in any given period can produce a highly distorted
view of what an obligor's income is. We shall return to a detailed analysis of
these issues in due course. In any event, the Comments acknowledge that the
court has to determine whether indeed the divorce brought about a "loss" of these
future opportunities. To resolve this question, the court is called upon to use
objective indicia, rather than the statements of the parents, specifically, "to do
what residential parents of similar wealth and background ordinarily do." Id.
§ 3.12 cmt. b. Apparently, there is yet another role for an expert witness!
30. Id. § 3.04 cmt. 1.
31. The ALI seems to overlook the transaction costs, in personal terms, to the payor
of producing the gross income. Arguably, a huge personal effort might only be
justified by the gross return, or a significant portion of it. True the ALI does
consider "negative effect[s]" but it then goes on to qualify this as meaning the
earner keeps less than he or she benefits by. Id. § 3.04 cmt. 1(i). However it may
be that in reality the payor may have no choice. As the Principles' Reporter
notes, full-time workers generally have little control over their hours of work and
cannot reduce their hours of work without the risk of losing their jobs. Id. § 3.04,
Reporter's Notes cmt. 1. Ordinarily, only if opportunities exist for overtime or an
additional job may a child support burden affect a work incentive. Id. Whether
this analysis holds true with the upper levels of option holders may be questiona-
ble. But at some point, an obvious effective wealth transfer in the form a child
support claim against currently granted options may be an incentive for a
wealthy employee to cease to work or at least not work as hard.
20041 955
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living standards in both households. But, a fixed contribution from
the payor, not linked to the payee's resources, would disadvantage the
payor if the residential parent's income increases. The ALI recognizes
that the position is complicated by the fact that the residential parent
potentially has a dual identity, namely as residential parent and labor
market participant, and that this duality may increase the desirabil-
ity of staying out of the workforce.32
Finally, as far as substantive concerns go, the Principles argue
that any support structure should encourage investment in vocational
training by the residential parent by making sure that that parent has
sufficient resources and the potential for gains that are worthwhile to
that parent and the residential household.3 3 Here we see a clear eli-
sion between funds notionally targeted directly at the child, and funds
that ultimately might produce a benefit to the child in terms of the
increased resources of the residential household, but which in the in-
terim lead to a cash flow aimed at benefitting the custodial parent. A
related theme obviously is the tension between this goal and the goal
of workforce participation, and the recognition that a child may have a
need for care, either parent or vendor provided. The Principles sug-
gest that the child support scheme should enable the residential par-
ent to make reasonable choices between gainful employment and the
personal provision of child care.34 Unresolved is whether leaving the
decision with the residential parent opens the door to abuse, given
that the scheme is supposed only to not discourage workforce partici-
pation, rather than affirmatively encourage it.3 5
C. The Search for a Formula
The Principles start by asking the amount of the transfer that
needs to take place to ensure that both parties will have the same
standard of living if we assume that to start with they have equal in-
comes, but now the child is residing with just one of them.36 The Prin-
32. Id. § 3.04 cmt. l(iii).
33. Id. § 3.04 cmt. m.
34. Id. at § 3.04 cmt. n.
35. Id. § 3.04 cmt. 1.
36. The approach of the Principles should be contrasted with various permutations of
what the Principles describe as "first-generation Marginal Expenditure" formu-
lae. These formulae start by seeking to identify what percentage of the joint
household expenditure was devoted to the child. This value is then implanted
into an Income Sharing analysis. This basically says that whatever percentage of
the family income was devoted to the child in the combined household should
continue to be contributed to the child from the combined income's of the parents
after the household breaks up. In the majority version of this approach the ac-
tual contribution of the obligor is to be weighted according to the proportion of the
combined income that he or she actually produces. In the minority version of the
approach, the residential parent's proportional contribution to the income is not
factored in. Whatever the marginal percentage of the combined family's income
[Vol. 82:947
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ciples express the view that that approach reflects "an obvious
principle of justice" and achieves all the goals outlined earlier. 37 This
conceptual amount is then supplemented by an amount necessary to
was that was used to support the child, is the percentage of the obligor's income
that must be contributed after the breakup. See generally id.; Glossary for Chap-
ter 3. Child Support, at 572-74. Conceptually, an Income Shares analysis does
not take into account the residential parent's actual income in determining the
amount of the obligor's payment. It only concerns itself with the combined in-
come of the parents for the purpose of determining the size of the obligor's obliga-
tion. In contrast, the ALI approach does concern itself with the residential
parent's income. In particular, the model assumes that the obligor's payment
should increase the child's residential household income, but that this payment
should decrease as this household income increases. See id. at 573 n.8. These
approaches can be distinguished from the so-called Equal Living Standards
model which is not adopted in any American jurisdiction but which the Glossary
notes is frequently advocated in feminist literature. This model seeks to ensure
that any post-dissolution reduction in the standard of living of the child is no
greater than that of the non-residential parent, and would use household equiva-
lence scales to determine what transfers would be needed by households of differ-
ent compositions to enjoy equal standards of living. Id. at 574. The Principles
contain an Appendix which in turn contains a discrete analysis of a child support
framework based on a Marginal Expenditure Formula. In this context, a Com-
ment notes that this approach has shortcomings from the point of view of the
child, because it does nothing to guarantee the standard of living of the child
since it does not focus on the economies of the individual households and because
it unduly may burden a parent to "contribute" a full percentage contribution de-
spite a low underlying income and thus carry a proportionately higher burden.
Id. § 3.05A cmts. g, h. Nevertheless, the Comments point out that the formula
does have an advantage over the "substantially more redistributive" Equal Living
Standards model and the "moderately more redistributive" ALI formula, because
it is the only approach which can be developed to entirely avoid a work disincen-
tive for the residential parent. Id. cmt. i. The ALI rejected the Equal Living
Standard Model because of its potential to deter the residential parent from gain-
ful employment, but saw the deterrent effect of its own proposals as "far more
limited" and in part offset by the income exemption component of its formula, id.,
although this aspect may not advance the interests of the non-residential parent
directly. See id. § 3.05(4)(a).
37. Id. § 3.05 cmt. d. This initial amount is analogized in the Principles to the margi-
nal expenditure that a parent contributes to the support of the child in the intact
household.
The Principles point out that this was the measure that most "first-generation
child-support guidelines" tended to rely upon, but it is pointed out that when
there is substantial income inequality between the parents, using this approach
may mean that the articulated support goals are not achievable. Id. In particu-
lar, if the obligor is the higher earner using just this base amount may not ensure
a minimum decent standard of living when both parents together are able to af-
ford it, and/or the child may end up with a standard of living which is grossly
inferior to that of one of the parents. If the obligor has the lower income, leaving
this base amount intact may produce undue hardship for the payor without ad-
vancing any of the goals of the scheme since, for example, the child may now be
enjoying a higher standard of living than if he or she resided with both parents.
Id. The Comments to the Principles point out that restricting the award to the
marginal expenditure in the common household does not tend serve any general
principle of justice and the only real interest it advances is that of a higher in-
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ensure that the child enjoys a minimum decent standard of living (if
this result is achievable) and to ensure that the child does not have a
standard of living grossly inferior to that of either parent.38 The
award is then subjected to a technical adjustment downward once the
residential parent's income crosses the threshold of an amount neces-
sary to sustain that parent at a minimum decent standard of living.39
The effect of this technical adjustment is that when both parents have
equal incomes of "sufficient" amount any supplement disappears.4o
As was indicated, the goal of the supplement is to ensure that the
child has a minimum decent standard of living when this can occur
without impoverishing a parent, as well as to achieve a standard of
living that is not grossly inferior to that of either parent. Beyond this,
the challenge in limiting the supplement is to avoid defeating the
higher-income parent's interest in enjoying the benefits of his or her
labor, even where these benefits are disproportionate relative to those
enjoyed by the child's other parent. 4 1 Under the model developed in
the Principles, no matter how many children were the beneficiaries of
the support order, the order was capped so as to ensure that the obli-
gor always retained more than half his net income.42
D. Deviation from the Formula
Because, as will emerge, stock option compensation devices have
the potential to produce high-risk-high-reward scenarios, coupled
with great uncertainty until the benefit actually is realized, if at all,
one of the issues that needs to be addressed is how much flexibility
any formula permits. The Principles recognize this type of problem
and make specific provision for deviation in some scenarios. Some of
the situations are particularly relevant to our present concerns. The
other aspect of this which will be reached in due course is the question
of the extent to which the child support scheme will tolerate efforts to
remedy inappropriate outcomes on an after the fact basis.
The Principles adopt the position that a formula based award is
presumptively just and appropriate. This presumption is one affect-
ing the burden of proof and is such that it creates an obligation to
establish from the perspective of the interests of the child that an un-
come obligor in ensuring that any outlay is no more than what the obligor con-
tributed during the intact marriage. Id.
38. Id. § 3.05 cmt. b.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at § 3.05 cmt. g.
42. Id.
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just or inappropriate result flows from the adoption of the formula for
one or more of a number of reasons specified in the Principles.43
Among the articulated justificatory reasons for departure from the
formula, some are potentially more likely to be encountered in situa-
tions involving stock options. In particular, deviation is justified if the
obligor has an extraordinarily high income and the amount deter-
mined by the formula exceeds the amount necessary to insure that the
child enjoys a standard of living that is adequate and not grossly infer-
ior to that of either parent and that the child's life opportunities are
adequately secured.44 Deviation also is justified if the parents have
agreed to a lesser amount, if there are special medical or dental needs,
or other special needs or gifts of the child which require additional
expenditures, if the deferred sale of a residence results in additional
savings or expenses with respect to housing, or if deviation is required
to support the exploitation of the child's life opportunities. 45
The Principles start from the perspective that the formula provides
adequate support once the child enjoys economic adequacy, a standard
of living not grossly inferior to that of either parent, and is not being
deprived of important life opportunities that ordinarily would have
been available if the child had resided with the obligor.4 6 Where the
obligor has an extraordinarily high income, as distinct from a merely
high income, the Comments to the Principles say that the extraordina-
rily high income should be treated as a basis for rebutting the formula
rather than as a general limitation on the amount of income subject to
the formula. The Comments argue that states that have adopted the
latter approach have often cut off the application of the formula at
inappropriately low limits of obligor or total parent income. The Com-
ments' position is that even if the parent enjoys a merely high income
there is no guarantee that an obligation expressed as a percentage of
that income will provide either similarly or adequately for the child.
The Comments view is that it is only when the obligor has an extraor-
dinarily high income that an amount which is appropriate according
to the formula will be factually excessive. Using the Principle's illus-
trative numbers the Comments suggest that anomaly is likely to
emerge with a parental income in excess of $200,000.47 What we are
43. Id. § 3.07 (1), (2). Federal law requires the creation of a presumption in favor of a
guideline amount. 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(0(2003).
44. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.07(2)(a).
45. Id. § 3.07 (2)(d)-(f).
46. Id. at § 3.07 cmt. c. The Comments seem to suggest that it is acceptable for a
court to adopt a position that beyond meeting the obligations underpinning the
formula it also is acceptable for the court to adopt the view that additional income
should be shared with the child on the basis of some unqualified principle that
this view is appropriate. This does suggest that the barn door is somewhat more
than ajar in environments where there are surplus resources.
47. Id. § 3.07 cmt. c.
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starting to encounter here is a classic boundary condition problem
where issues of economic value meet issues of social value, or, in an-
other sense, where we shift from a zone of clear economic necessity to
one where the issue is economic acceptability. The complexity of the
situation is compounded because once one proceeds beyond the realm
of axiomatic consumption dictated need, the focus of the support be-
comes less directed and thus increases the risks of the support falling
outside the parameters of acceptability provided by the underlying
principles. 48 In short, we run the risk that the payor is being called
upon to pay amounts which are excessive and which end up being
used for inappropriate purposes or enuring to the benefit of inappro-
priate beneficiaries. Perhaps appropriately, the Comments acknowl-
edge that these extraordinarily high income cases are likely to require
individualized treatment by the courts. Whether this individualized
treatment is also demanded in option based award scenarios not just
because the income is extraordinarily high but also because the re-
source on which the award is based is extraordinarily complex and
problematic is something we shall return to when we come to consider
how the parties incomes are to be determined and the extent to which
orders are subject to modification.
The Principles contemplate deviation from a formulaic approach
pursuant to an agreement between the parties, unless the deviation is
substantially less than is contemplated by the formula. Even here
however, the amount payable as a result of the Principles permit the
court to accept the agreement, if when the child-support provisions
are "read with the agreement as a whole," they are consistent with the
interests of the child.49 The Comments suggest that a state could
adopt substantive acceptable percentage deviations, such as ten or
twenty percent, or could assess substantiality in terms of the total re-
sources of the residential household taking into account income from
all sources, since in such a situation, in the Comment's view, the law
has little interest in insisting on the letter of the statute if the parties
have agreed to the contrary. 50 The Comments further suggest that
the agreement has to be looked at as a whole, because the various
economic elements of the dissolution are interchangeable. In particu-
lar the parties may wish to increase one element and correspondingly
diminish another, for example out of a desire to achieve tax savings or
48. See Jelinek v. Jelinek, No. 1-90-2550, 1992 Ill. App. LEXIS 1662, at *17-18 (Ill.
App. Ct. Oct. 13, 1992) (citing In re Marriage of Stockton, 523 N.E.2d 573 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (holding that using portion of the household expenses associated
with maintaining two residences awarded to the residential parent to determine
the children's needs for the purpose of determining child support led to an exag-
gerated figure of support and was to be condemned)).
49. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.13(1).
50. Id. § 3.13 cmt. b.
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motivated by circumstances or wishes peculiar to themselves. 5 1 These
last two viewpoints of the Comments are likely to be particularly sig-
nificant in the context of the distribution of options in the context of a
divorce. Technically the manipulation of options to extract a predeter-
mined value such as is required by a prospective child support order, if
it is even possible to do so, may evolve into a complex undertaking in
which considerations like tax liability,52 both as to amount and re-
sponsibility, is but a component. As has been suggested elsewhere,
options just aren't like the old family Ford.53 Accordingly, a system
which readily defers to the efforts of the parties to optimize a solution
should be welcomed. Ordinarily, if well advised, the parties should be
much more motivated and capable than a hard-pressed divorce court
to achieve an appropriately sensitive result.
E. Defining Income
For the purposes of establishing a child support order, the Princi-
ples start by defining income as income "from all sources," subject to
some exclusions none of which is relevant for our purposes.5 4 Certain
classes of "income" are then dealt with specifically on the basis that
they are more "problematic".55 But, stock options escape this net. For
our purposes, some of the provisions relating to the imputation of in-
come are of particular interest, as are some of the aspects of the think-
ing behind the process of imputation. This is because, as we shall see,
compensatory stock options may produce no substantive yield for a
significant period of time, and, indeed, may never produce a yield. Ac-
cordingly, as will emerge, the nature of stock options is such that they
51. Id. § 3.13 cmt. c.
52. See Coleman v. Coleman, Nos. 229976: 230995, 2002 Mich. App. LEXIS 1720, at
*7-8 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002) (holding that child support manual required
that net after tax proceeds of exercising options be used in calculating child
support).
53. See David S. Rosettenstein, Options on Divorce: Taxation, Compensation Ac-
countability, and the Need to Look for Holistic Solutions, 37 FAm. L.Q. 203, 239
(2003).
54. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.14(1)(a). However, within any given state system it
might be possible to argue that contributions made to a stock option plan should
be excluded for the purposes of determining an obligor's net monthly income
when calculating child support. See In re Marriage of Salmela, No. C8-90-1625,
1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 95 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 1991) (appeal court rejects
trial court's earlier approach of excluding contributions to a stock option plan); In
re Marriage of Dodd, 532 S.W.2d 885, 889 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (child support and
maintenance awards not excessive, "especially ... since his net monthly income
does not include . . ." contributions to a savings plan and a stock option plan).
Apart from whether it is technically permissible under the jurisdiction's rules,
the legitimacy of the argument may hinge on what approach the jurisdiction
takes to permitting an obligor some discretion in investment strategy. We will
return to that theme in due course.
55. Id. § 3.14 cmt. a.
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tend to invite a process which effectively involves the imputation of
income, or at least the analog of the process of imputing income.
On the issue of the thinking behind the imputation of income, it is
worth noting that the Principles are willing to recognize in-kind bene-
fits to an employee as income. Ordinarily this would have no rele-
vance to our concerns at all, except that, conceptually, it opens the
door to the idea that support may assessed on a value which is not
readily translateable into real money.56 Acknowledging this, the
Principle's Comments suggest that the ultimate issue is the extent to
which the benefit augments the parent's real income. 57
The Principles require that an ordinary rate of return be imputed
to an asset that yields less than the ordinary rate of return; as an
ordinary rate of return is the prevailing rate of return for secure in-
vestments.5 8 When it comes to dealing with assets which yield below
an ordinary rate of return, the Principles' perspective is that a "parent
may choose to invest in growth rather than income-producing assets,
but that choice should not ordinarily limit the amount of income avail-
able for child support."5 9 This analysis becomes significant when we
come to deal with issues relating to unvested, immature, and unexer-
cised options, as well as with the issue of the relevancy of the role the
employee played in the structuring the compensation package. After
all, is the employee required to decline compensation in the form of
options in order to maximize immediate cash flow, if not the total re-
turn? What if the employer insists on the option's component? Must
the employee decline the job? The Comments give the illustration of
one Linda who earns a substantial salary as manager of a closely held
corporation which is owned entirely by her and her siblings. The stock
is not publicly traded, but has value attributed to it. No dividends are
paid. The example suggests that Linda needs to retain ownership of
the stock to maintain her position and influence in the business. The
Comments take the position that income should not be imputed, be-
cause of her need to maintain her job and influence in the firm which
are concerns which ultimately benefit her children, but which at the
same time make Linda unable to liquidate her asset.6 o In due course
56. Additionally, it is one thing to assess an employee on the basis of the value of a
benefit where that benefit represents a savings, that is, it represents funds that
the employee would have spent in the ordinary course out of the salary paid. It is
something else to assess an obligation where the salary offered is adjusted down-
ward to reflect the value of the benefit conferred, especially where the benefit is
for a good which household equivalency analysis would allow the obligor to ex-
pense in advance of determining income available for fixing child support. See id.
§ 3.14 cmt. c, ill. 2.
57. Id. § 3.14 cmt. d.
58. Id. § 3.14(4)(b).
59. Id. § 3.14 cmt. d.
60. Id. § 3.14 cmt. d, ill. 3.
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we will take a look at these justification just outlined in the context of
the generality of option cases. Additionally, we will consider, in the
context of options, the ramifications which flow from an element of the
Comment's example, namely the fact that Linda is a "relational"
shareholder, that is, she is in a position, for example, to.entrench man-
agement. 6 1 This fact opens the door to pre- and post-divorce collusive
behavior.6 2
Notionally, the Principles accept the idea that earnings may be im-
puted to both the residential and non-residential parent. Neverthe-
less, different considerations are used to underpin the analysis. As far
as the non-residential parent is concerned, the premise is that imputa-
tion may be necessary to deal with an obligor who is concealing income
or shirking efforts to earn income. The Comments note that such im-
putation raises cause for concern if the obligor is saddled with obliga-
tions which cannot be met, even with the best of efforts, given that
there are serious legal consequences that flow from a failure to pay
child support. Accordingly, the Comments advise that a court should
exercise caution when considering the imputation of earnings in these
scenarios.63
The Principles contain some safe havens from income imputation,
most of which have no relevance for our purposes. However, perhaps
noteworthy is the idea that income should not be imputed following a
change in occupation so long as the support produced through the
"new occupation does not unreasonably reduce the child's standard of
living taking into account the child's total economic circumstances."64
The ALI clearly had in mind a not atypical scenario of an obligor who
changes occupation and thus reduces his or her income. But, what of
the obligor who changes employment, or or even just status with the
same employer, and thus triggers a different compensation structure,
in particular one containing options. Here, short term benefits might
be waived in return for the possibility of higher long term yields. Is
this a circumstance for imputation, or freedom from imputation, or
conditional freedom from imputation, along the lines just indicated in
the quotation? These too are themes for later.
The residential parent is freed from the risk of imputation of in-
come so long as he or she is caring for a child under the age of six, and
thereafter the parent is only accountable for such income as is consis-
tent with the parent's residential responsibility for a child of the par-
61. See generally Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994).
62. Some courts base the analysis on whether the employee has control over the as-
sets and income of the employer. See Clark v. Clark, 779 A.2d 42, 52-53 (Vt.
2001) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
63. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.14 cmt. e(i).
64. Id. § 3.14(5)(b).
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ties.6 5 Here the immediate interests of the child provide the
foundation for the protective umbrella. Beyond the example of Linda
raised earlier, it is not clear whether, and how readily, in the instance
of the non-residential parent, a deferred and perhaps enhanced bene-
fit such as might be found in an option laden compensation package
that could enure to the future advantage of the child, might by policy
analogy be sheltered from imputation.66 In concept, the imputation of
earnings to the non-resident parent is done with a view to advancing
the interests of the child. The imputation of income to the residential
parent after a point is done on the basis of an analysis of what is fair
between the parties.6 7 Initially, the assumption is that with a child
below six and not yet attending school, it is axiomatically in the child's
interests to have the residential parent available-the Principles pro-
vide no scope for an economic analysis of the thesis. 68 Thereafter,
65. Id. § 3.15(1)(a), (2).
66. See supra text accompanying note 60.
67. Id. § 3.14 cmt. e(ii)-(iii). When it comes to the imputation of income to the resi-
dential parent, the Principles impose a cap on the amount that can be imputed.
Id. § 3.15(2). The technical effect of this imputation is to ensure that the non-
residential obligor's payment requirement does not fall below the base percentage
determined under the ALI formula, even though it could fall below this figure if
the residential parent's actual income exceeded that of the non-residential par-
ent. The argument for this distinction is that the imputation of income adversely
affects the economic interests of the child, since the money is not actually in
hand, in contrast to the situation where the residential parent actually has the
funds. See id. § 315 cmt. b. (discussing the fact that the a residential parent may
be underemployed by reason of a judgment call to increase child care, while the
non-residential parent may be "shirking"). The effect of this cap is to ensure that
the balance is always tilted in favor of the residential parent, as between the
parents. That is to say, no matter how much money the residential parent volun-
tarily withdraws from the parties joint resources, there is a point beyond which it
is always equitable for that parent to do so. The Principles provide the non-resi-
dential parent with no safe harbor, for example relating to investment objectives,
which might cap the level of income imputed to the obligor. However, it is just
possible that a court might be able to scratch some relief out of section 3.15(5)
which does allow the court to take into account the relative economic situation of
the parties. Additionally, section 3.15 comment e recognizes that pursuant to
subsection (4) the cap on imputation of income to the residential parent may be
ignored if the effect of not doing so is to raise the non-residential parent's support
obligation in circumstances where the non-residential parent's income initially is
lower than the income of the residential parent.
68. While the basic position may be consistent with what most Americans think is a
desirable situation it does not conform to reality. Sixty one percent of women
with children under three work and that rises to seventy three percent of all wo-
men with children. Wobbly First Steps, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 2003, at 34. In
contrast, one study suggests that a dollar invested in a full day year round pre-
school would yield four dollars in the long run to children, their families and tax-
payers. Id. (citing a study by the National Institute for Early Education Re-
search). This sort of analysis would suggest that the assumption underpinning
the failure to impute income could be reversed, in essence that the residential
parent should be required to work, unless doing so demonstrably was not in the
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subject to a consideration of a "parent's residential responsibility for
the children of the parties,"6 9 a court is freed to impute income.
Does this lead to an analysis that produces fairness between the
parties? Maybe not. First, it should be remembered that the basic
structure of the ALI formula takes as an operating model that the
amount the obligor owes goes up as the residential household income
goes down.70 So a residential parent's inertia has the tendency to in-
crease the obligor's burden. Yet, the Comments accept that when the
law imputes gainful earnings to residential parents, it expresses a
judgment about how they should allocate their time between gainful
employment and child rearing, a matter normally left to the decision-
making of parents.71 But the Comments here ignore an awkward an-
alytical elision. It is one thing for the both parents to decide that one
should stay home. The analysis at least becomes questionable when
that authority is given to one parent alone. Moreover, that parent is
given the authority by virtue of the residential arrangements made for
the child, not necessarily because of any underlying legal authority
such as might be vested in a sole legal custodian.7 2 There has got to
be a point beyond which the child's reasonable requirements have
been met so that the extent and structure of the non-residential par-
ent's income should no longer primarily be evaluated in terms of as-
sumed interests of the child and should only be evaluated, if at all, on
the basis of what is fair between the parents. As the Comments note,
at some point it becomes necessary to recognize a "parent's autonomy
interest in determining the nature of his gainful employment."73 We
only should ensure that the child does not suffer unreasonably on ac-
count of the parent's choice, and this issue has to be evaluated in the
context of the child's total economic circumstances, rather than the
fact that the obligor's support payment may be lower than it otherwise
might have been.7 4
child's interests. Such an approach would put the income imputed to the residen-
tial parent and the obligor on the same footing.
69. Id. § 3.15(1)(a).
70. See supra note 36.
71. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at § 3.15 cmt. b. The comment also admonishes the
court to approach imputation of earnings to the residential parent with "even
greater circumspection" than it does the imputation of earnings to the obligor.
Id.
72. We will gloss over any issues relating to the conflict of interest that must arise
with respect to the decision-making of a residential parent in a household con-
taining children from a subsequent relationship.





The ALI Principles correctly acknowledge that in assessing a child
support obligation we have to take into account the parent's tax obli-
gation. 7 5 The Principles accept that it does not matter whether one
takes the pre- or post-tax income for use in the calculations as long as
the percentage allocated for child support is adjusted accordingly.
However, it is suggested that for practical implementation purposes it
is easier to work with after-tax incomes. Up to this point there are no
obvious problems. However, then the Principles go on to suggest that
for administrative simplicity and fairness aimed at "insulating the
child-support obligation from individual strategies to reduce income
subject to income taxation and child support" the applicable rates of
tax applied to reduce the gross income should be based on the average
percentages of income payable in taxes at different income levels.76
Here the analysis runs into difficulty. To start with, it assumes that
we know with a reasonable level of comfort what the pre-tax income of
the obligor is, so that an appropriate average tax rate can be assigned
to it. As we shall see when it comes to stock options this preliminary
step it is not one that is easily taken. Second, it is may be possible to
come up with scenarios which are tax minimizing and perhaps in-
come-available-for-support maximizing so that the unsophisticated
adoption of an average approach may short-change the child by a sig-
nificant amount. 7 7
Option-holders simply do not necessarily fall into the mold of the
obligor who leverages a tax-based subsidy to mortgage interest rates
to enable him or her to purchase larger premises and in the process
reduce after tax income. It may be that average rates do suffice for
such a case. However, it seems somewhat ironic that a system which
is concerned not to saddle an individual arbitrarily with imputed in-
come because of the severe consequences that can flow from not satis-
fying the support obligation, is nevertheless quite happy to run the
risk of doing just that by not recognizing the taxes that the individual
obligor actually pays. And the tax burden imposed on option holders
may be far from a straightforward question, both as to the amount
owed as well as the identity of the person receiving the tax bill.78 Is
the adoption of average tax bill to assess support obligations actually
75. Id. § 3.14 cmt. j.
76. Id.
77. This is particularly true in the case of so-called Incentive Stock Options. If prop-
erly handled they are amenable to "capital gains" rather than an "ordinary in-
come" tax treatment. See Rosettenstein, supra note 52. For a comparison of the
underlying tax treatments of Incentive Stock Options and Non-Qualified Stock
Options, see Jack E. Karns & Jerry G. Hunt, Should Unexercised Stock Options
be Considered "Gross Income" Under Sate Law for Purposes of Calculating
Monthly Child Support Payments?, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 235, 241-250 (2000).
78. See infra note 154; Rosettenstein, supra note 53.
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a reflection of the fact that the ordinary family lawyer and/or adminis-
trative officer does not feel comfortable calculating true tax liabilities
and hence true rates? In short do the proposals actually more reflect
the participants' inadequacies rather than the dictates of fairness?
What is a legitimate price to pay to achieve simplicity? Indeed, the
efficiency determination may be made with a time horizon that is too
proximate. After all, a simple result at the point of establishing the
order can produce an obligation which the payor in fact is unable to
meet, or conversely where the payor ends up with more after tax re-
sources than was originally anticipated. Accordingly, we face the
prospect of post-judgment modification proceedings in which we have
to determine what the payor can or should pay.7 9 Presumably, at this
point, we are entitled to consider what the obligor's actual tax bill is.
In short, at least in some cases, by adopting an average tax rate, we
have simply delayed the day on which a detailed analysis of the par-
ties' actual circumstances has to be conducted. The wings of the but-
terfly start to flutter! Wouldn't it be more just to look at the issue of
tax strategy in the context of imputation of income, where a court
could examine the "legitimacy" of the obligor's tax plan. Finally, when
it comes to stock options, unless the Internal Revenue Service clarifies
the situation to the contrary, it is quite possible for one parent to re-
ceive the income and the other parent to receive the tax bill!80 In such
a situation, the use of a notional tax liability can reach unique levels
of absurdity.
G. Modification
The Principles permit the modification of child support orders
under certain circumstances. Aspects of this process are of interest to
our present concerns given the highly contingent characteristics of
stock options - both as to the issue of whether the options will exist as
a source of income at the relevant time and as to the amount of income
that will be available from this source. On the premise that most sup-
port obligors are regularly employed for wages, the Principles advo-
cate expressing child-support obligations as a percentage of the
obligor's income from time to time and continuously and automatically
updating the award.8 1 Ordinarily, this model clearly will not fit the
situation where options are the source of income. Of much more use
79. The process also overlooks the injustice of saddling an obligor with a child-sup-
port liability which under-weights his or her tax bill. Beyond the tax bill itself,
the obligor also carries the transaction costs of attempting to get the obligation
modified. Indeed, depending on the presumptive force of the child-support guide-
lines in any jurisdiction there may be no ability to get a modification, so that the
obligor is condemned to an oppressive payment regime until the point when he or
she is unable to pay.
80. See Rosettenstein, supra note 53.
81. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.18(1) cmts. b, c.
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would be the provisions in the Principles permitting modification in
terms of the order itself, even though this provision was envisaged as
operating under the umbrella of a conventional automatic and contin-
uous update scenario.8 2 Additionally, the Principles permit modifica-
tion on the petition of either party if he or she is able to demonstrate a
substantial change in circumstances, in particular if a re-application
of the formula would yield a substantial change in the amount of the
award.8 3 This element of the Principles could benefit either party.
However a traditional overarching rule adopted under federal pres-
sure is that child support orders are not retroactively modifiable.S4
The Principles follow this rule.S5 Given the unreliability of an income
stream based on options, this represents a significant potential trap
for obligors who are not diligent.
With this brief and highly selective survey of some of the consider-
ations that go into determining the extent of support obligations
under our belt we turn to look at the nature of stock options.
III. THE NATURE OF STOCK OPTIONS
A. The Structure of the Grant
A stock option entitles the option holder (the grantee) to acquire
stock in a company at a pre-determined price, called the exercise price
or the strike price.8 6 Generally the option remains exercisable for a
finite period of time, which may be as long as ten years from the date
of the grant of the option. Where the grant is made by an employer as
part of a compensation package, the grant usually comes with strings
attached. For example, the grant maybe lost, in whole or part, if the
grantee ceases to remain in the employ of the grantor for a specified
period of time. Once that time has expired, the grant is said to be
"vested". In common parlance vesting is the point in time after which
the employee is free to exercise the option. In reality, the option vest-
ing point may represent a moment of absolute entitlement of the em-
ployee, even though the option may not be able to be exercised until a
82. Id. §§ 3.17(1)(a), 3.18(1).
83. Id. §§ 3.17(l)(c), 3.20(1).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9).
85. PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, § 3.23(1), cmts. a, b.
86. JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, VENTURE CAPITAL 226 (1988). Usually, the exercise price is
the market price of the underlying stock at the date of the grant. This is due to
the fact that under current American accounting standards, if this approach is
not adopted the granting corporation has to reflect the grant of the option as an
expense in its balance sheet. In turn, this is because if the grant is a "fixed price"
grant the reportable expense is the difference between the exercise price and the
fair market value of the underlying stock at the date of the grant. See Opinions of
the Accounting Principles Board No. 25, Accounting for Stock Issued to Employ-
ees, 471-72 (1972).
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later point in time when it is said to "mature."8 7 However, for the
purposes of our discussion, unless the context indicates otherwise, the
term "vest" will be used to indicate the point at which the grantee is
free to exercise the option and acquire the underlying stock.88 It is
worth noting that the point at which the employee is free to exercise
the option is not necessarily the point at which the employee is free to
sell the underlying stock. The sale of the stock may be subject to de-
lays or disincentives. These limitations may affect the "extractable"
value. The delays may be imposed by the employer8 9 or by operation
of law.90
The vesting process itself may be subject to any number of contin-
gencies. For example, beyond loss of the grant for failure to remain in
the employer's employ, the grant also may provide that in certain
other circumstances the option will be lost, such as, for example,
where the employer undergoes a "change of control".91 In other in-
stances, such an eventuality may produce only a partial loss of the
grant. A change of control also may result in the partial or total "ac-
celeration" of the vesting period. 92 In this scenario the grantee is able
87. For further discussion of these classifications, see Rosettenstein, supra note 3, at
272.
88. Otley v. Otley, 810 A.2d 1, 3 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).
89. These processes may operate in various ways. Thus, in Otley it seems (though
the language of the report is confusing) that while the transfer of the stock was
not restricted, it was subject to a right of preemption by the employer or other
shareholders. 810 A.2d at 7. This case refers to the case of Klingenberg v.
Klingenberg, 675 A.2d 551 (Md. 1996), in which there appears that there was a
repurchase agreement to take effect on retirement, death or disability and where
there was a structure in place for determining the value. Otley, 810 A.2d at 7.
90. A good example of how complicated the situation can get is provided by Burtman
v. Technical Chemicals and Products, Inc., 724 So. 2d 672, 673-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999). An attorney received options as compensation for services. The op-
tions were placed in a trust to meet his alimony and child support obligations.
When the options were exercised the issuer issued restricted stock. The ability to
sell the stock was conditioned on registration with the Security and Exchange
Commission (hereinafter the "SEC"), or on obtaining an opinion from the issuer's
counsel that the stock could be sold without registration by virtue of falling under
a statutory exemption from the registration requirement. That exemption should
have been available under SEC Rule 144 (17 C. F. R. § 230.144) by virtue of the
fact that the restricted stock had been held for a period of more than a year.
However, the issuer's counsel declined to provide the opinion because the issuer
was in litigation with the attorney over the services for which the options were
compensation. Accordingly, the alimony and child support trust was unable to
extract the underlying value.
In Otley, 810 A.2d 1, the options were Incentive Stock Options, as the concept
is understood by section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Code imposes
constraints on the alienation of the options or resulting stock on pain of losing the
ability to defer the incurring of a tax liability and also losing a favorable capital
gains treatment.
91. See, e.g., Garcia v. Mayer, 920 P.2d 522, 523 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996).
92. See Otley, 810 A.2d at 3.
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to exercise some or all of the options at a point in time which is earlier
than ordinarily would have been the case. A similar acceleration may
flow from the corporation meeting certain performance objectives 93
such as, in a simple example, when the underlying stock achieves a
specified price. Beyond employment continuity or performance re-
lated conditions or conditions relating to changes of control, the gran-
tor generally is free to attach to the grant whatever conditions it
chooses. Conceptually, it is important to understand that these grants
may be subject to both conditions precedent and conditions subse-
quent,9 4 which in their most extreme manifestations may enable the
granting employer to cancel the grant in its entirety, and which in any
event have the potential to affect radically the performance character-
istics of the grant.
B. The Rationale for the Grant and the Concept of Income
In its most common manifestation, the reason for the grant suppos-
edly is to create an identity of interest between the stockholders and
the employee. Further, any vesting period is designed to encourage
the employee to remain in the employ of the employer. Arguably, dur-
ing this period the employee is "earning" the option. But, if the under-
lying rationale is correct, that is that the grant is an incentive for the
employee to exercise his or her best efforts to improve shareholder
value, then in one sense, any enhanced value generated after the vest-
ing period, due, say, to an appreciation of the underlying stock price,
also was earned beyond the vesting date. Now, not all grants work
this way, or only work this way in a limited sense. Thus, an employer
may make an option grant to induce an employee to come and work for
the employer and also possibly to compensate the job candidate for
benefits from a previous employer that might be lost when the em-
ployee jumps ship. Here, the period during which the options are
earned arguably may be identified as a particular moment in time.
Or, this period may "capture" some historical time which may then
run forward into the future employment up to the point of vesting, or
even beyond. Some employers make grants to acknowledge the suc-
cess of a particular project, so again the option may be earned at a
particular point in time or over an identifiable period of time in the
past. Some employers routinely make options part of their regular
compensation package. Accordingly, employees, particularly at the
mid and upper level of management, can expect to get options on, say,
an annual basis. What significance does all of this have to us? The
amount of a child support award is based on what "income" the indi-
93. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Powell, 934 P.2d 612, 613 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
94. See, e.g., In re Robinson v. Thiel, 35 P.3d 89, 93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
if option is not exercisable for a year, then 25% of the grant exercisable each year
and any options not exercised at the end of ten years are lost).
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vidual is expected to have available to support a household. It should
be obvious that an isolated grant of options which produces a real cash
flow in any given year after the options are exercised and the underly-
ing stock is sold is likely to produce a highly distorted picture of the
individual's income for the purpose of fixing the amount of an award,
even though the cash flowing from the exercise and stock sale, in prin-
ciple, would be a perfectly legitimate resource to look to in order to
meet the obligations of an otherwise appropriately determined sup-
port order. In such a situation, would it be appropriate to look to the
period over which the benefit from the option was or will be "earned"
in order to calculate what the individual's "income" is or will be ? For
example, if the option takes three years from the date of grant to vest-
ing should it be said that the "income" attributable to each of those
three years is one third of the net proceeds flowing from the exercise of
the option and the sale of the underlying stock?
The suggestion just made has a certain superficial appeal. After
all, when the grantee receives what are essentially isolated grants,
treating the proceeds of the exercise as income attributable to one
year is bound to produce an unrealistic "spike" in the grantee's income
for that year and presumably lead to an unreasonable prospective or-
der. The effect of assigning the income to the number of years that it
took to "earn" the resulting benefit has the effect of "smoothing" the
apparent flow of income and thus the "income" used to determine the
child support obligation. Of course, what we are attempting to do is
establish a prospective order based on current income. Under the
model just outlined, only income "earned' in the current year should
be used to fix the amount of child support. Should we be free to ex-
pand the model and deem the grantee to have income for as many
years in the future as we assume it took in the past to earn the bene-
fit? Doing so would both smooth the amount of the income used to
calculate the support and also would ensure that income "earned" in
the past was not lost to the child-even if the process is logically at
odds with what conventional child support formulae would seem to
require. However, any analysis along these lines has to be conducted
with some care. Beyond the fundamental point of the acceptability of
using an historical, and perhaps isolated, grant to set a prospective
obligation,9 5 considerable attention needs to be paid to the issue of
the time "required" to earn the income. Additionally, there is a partic-
ular moment in time at which the grantee is free to exercise the op-
tion, but in the ordinary course of events is not required to do so,
because the option will remain open for exercise for perhaps many
95. An operation which some courts perform without question. See In re Marriage of
Maciejewski, No. D037304, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3478, at *10, *15 (Cal.
Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2002).
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more years. To what extent should the grantee be entitled to defer the
exercise?
Conventional option valuation theory suggests that the exercise of
an option should be deferred until the last possible moment in order to
extract the optimum value from the option. But, beside the question
of optimization is the issue of obstruction. Potentially, it might be to
the grantee's advantage to extend the point of realization further into
the future and then argue that the "income" should be determined
over the this extended period as well. In principle, this might have
the effect of reducing the amount of any support order. Of course, this
is not necessarily true since the actual appreciation in the value of the
underlying stock during the extended period may lead to an order
which is higher than previously would have been able to be made if
the determination had been made at the moment of vesting. Never-
theless, the grantee's residual share of the option benefits also will be
higher in such circumstances. Beyond the question of the allowing the
grantee to reduce the amount of his or her notional income by ex-
tending the time over which the "income" is deemed to have been
earned, the injection of time introduces into the analysis some other
elements which may or may not operate to the grantee's advantage.
First, the delay may give the obligor the opportunity to speculate with
respect to the residential parent's future. After all, with time, the res-
idential parent's financial situation may improve so that as long as
that is a component of the analysis to determine the support obliga-
tion, the delay may result in the reduction of the relative burden car-
ried by the grantee obligor. Indeed, as we saw with the ALI proposals,
the residential parent's absolute entitlement to withdraw from the
marketplace disappears with time. Time may work to the obligor's
advantage in another respect as well. Child support is not an open-
ended commitment. In many states it ends on the child attaining ma-
jority and, even where the state has extended the duty into the years
of secondary education, the obligation is not limitless. Thus, it could
be to an obligor's advantage to defer the option based support determi-
nation to as late in the day as possible so as to lead to the order hitting
a mandatory cut-off boundary. Again, however, absolute arguments
are not possible in this regard because it is quite likely that with the
passage of time the child's needs may increase as may the yield from
the options.
To summarize for a moment, there is one issue of the extent to
which the options should be considered to be earned over a period of
time, together with the related issue of how long that period should be
considered to be. Additionally, there is the overarching question of at
what moment in time, for the purpose of the court's analysis, income
should be determined in fact to be earned, in the sense of appropri-
ately being included in the support calculation.
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Given the potential ambiguities of the situation beyond the vesting
point, it would seem to be appropriate to use this vesting as the earli-
est moment for the determination of what the obligor's income is.96 In
reality this is the time when the obligor could extract cash from the
grant and conceptually chooses not to do so. This would seem to be an
investment choice, and the grantee should be saddled with this
choice. 9 7 But, again, care is needed. The grantee should be burdened
for calculation purposes with no more than the grantee can actually
extract from the option. It is unfair to determine a notional value for
the option using a technique which enhances the option value by con-
sidering the time the option is supposedly able to remain open for ex-
ercise98 when we are dealing with a grant which the grantee is not
free to trade on the open market. The need to focus on the grantee's
actual ability to benefit from the grant raises other considerations.
The conditions of the grant, the grantee's terms of employment, Secur-
ities Exchange Commission rules, or the rules of a stock exchange,
may all affect the ability of the grantee to dispose of the underlying
security obtained by exercising the option.99 And, unless the grantee
is free to dispose of the option as such, it is only when the underlying
security is sold that income can be realized from the grant. Accord-
ingly, perhaps the grantee should also be credited with the period un-
til the underlying security itself can be disposed of, and that this
period as well should be included in the time taken to "earn" the bene-
fit. This assumes that the relationship between the grantor employer
and the grantee is at arms length. Clearly, where the grantee is in a
position to have the grant structured in a way that would defeat sup-
port obligations there could be circumstances that would justify bas-
ing the support obligation on some imputed time frame rather than
the apparent realities of the grant0oo
The existence of isolated grants, as distinct from a annual system
of compensation grants, and a willingness to impute income to an obli-
gor, raises the possibility of an entirely different mode of analysis.
Obviously, we simply could treat the value of the option as "income."
But, what if we treated the option's value not as a source of "income",
but rather as a capital asset? This conceptual distinction has been
made in the context of divorce cases where, in the ordinary course,
options are distributed as part of the property division between the
96. As was done by the court in Mackinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d 680, 683 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2002).
97. See Mackinley, 814 A.2d at 682-83.
98. As occurs with the Black-Scholes valuation model. See infra text accompanying
note 109.
99. See In re Dolan, 786 A.2d 820, 822 (N.H. 2001).
100. See Dolan, 786 A.2d at 823; In re C. J., No. 05-98-01973-CV, 2001 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3067, *6 (Tex. Ct. App. May 10, 2001) (no evidence that the obligor re-
ceived the "options as compensation in lieu of income to defraud his children").
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parties. Again, we should remind ourselves what we are about. The
object of the exercise is to determine the obligor's "income" for the pur-
pose of setting child support. At this stage we are not charged with
locating assets out of which any obligation can be met. As was sug-
gested earlier, it is totally appropriate to use some or all of the value
extractable from an option grant to meet the demands of an appropri-
ate support order. The issue at this stage of the analysis is what is
"appropriate." To make this determination it would seem to be rea-
sonable, once an option grant had reached the stage in its life when it
could be classified as an investment choice, not to deem the option
itself to be income, but rather to impute income to the grant based on
some underlying value, and then use this imputed income as the basis
for fixing the amount of any child support obligation.
There is a third possibility. This might involve a hybrid of the two
previous approaches. Here there would be a consideration of the way
the intact family or, perhaps, the obligor, had utilized option grants in
their or his or her domestic economies in the past. Accordingly, if the
family treated grants as an annual source of income, with each grant
being cashed out as soon as it vested, it might be appropriate to con-
tinue assuming such a use in determining "income" for support pur-
poses. In contrast, if the family realized the grant proceeds, invested
them, and then consumed the resulting income, adopting an income
analysis which assumed that such a strategy continued does not seem
to be inappropriate. The prospect of a detailed facts and circum-
stances analysis replete with arguments of unique circumstances and
special justifications may not be appealing, whether from the perspec-
tive of judicial or administrative efficiency, or even as matter of social
aesthetics. But, it could conceivably produce a result which is more
just, at least as between the parties. Of course, historical practice is
not necessarily a legitimate premise for establishing a current obliga-
tion which now is encumbered with both the interests of the state and
the interests of the child-advanced as a claimant in his or her own
right, rather than as the haphazard beneficiary of whatever largesse
parents in an intact family had chosen to dispense. Nevertheless, his-
tory reflects what the parents' did and it would seem to have contin-
ued relevance unless the inefficiencies of the process, or the family
disintegration itself, provide axiomatic justifications for ignoring prior
use of the options in determining family support obligations.
Each of the strategies just outlined relies on an assumption that
we reliably can determine a basic amount which is earned or deemed
to be "earned" over the relevant years, or is deemed to be capable of
being cashed out and spent. It is to some problems associated with
these considerations that we now turn.
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C. Income Versus Value
The reality of option grants is that in most instances it is virtually
impossible to know 1 0 1 the true value of the option until the proceeds
from the grant are actually realized.10 2 The one notable exception is
where the grantee is in possession of a grant whose terms and condi-
tions exactly match the terms and conditions of options widely traded
in the open market, and the holder of the grant is free to sell his or her
holdings.103 Options held by employees usually would fail to cross
both hurdles. Most grants aimed at compensating employees are sub-
ject to a variety of restrictions which are not found in generally traded
options. Then, many employees are not free to sell their options on the
open market, even if there is a market. After all, what employer
wants to have an employee able to free himself or herself from the
risks of an incentive scheme? In the same vein, the grant may pro-
101. This proposition is true even if all available information is known. It glosses over
the question of whether a non-grantee will be able to discover all the information
that is available. Indeed, even though jurisdictions are increasingly imposing a
duty to reveal on an asset holder, rather than an earlier approach which relied
upon a duty to discover, this duty tends to be imposed in the context of divorce
proceedings generically, rather than specifically in the context of child support
claims. Of course, in the latter instance, the consequences flowing from non-dis-
closure may be less in as much as support obligations are modifiable. However,
constraints on retroactive modification may mean that historical "losses" may not
be able to be recaptured. One further wrinkle to the problem is provided by the
fact that the employer may seek to obstruct the disclosure of information. See
Schnabel v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63 (1992) (after balancing the inter-
ests in having the information against the employer's privacy concern, the court
orders an employer, in which a spouse had a 30% interest, to make extensive
disclosure of financial information).
102. Thus, a jurisdiction may set up an operational preference for deferring the need
to determine the value (at least for property division purposes) until the point
when the value is actually liquidated. See, e.g., Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law. § 8-
204(b)(1) (1999). In Kristy Watson, Note, Acting in the Best Interests of the Child:
A Solution to the Problem of Characterizing Stock Options as Income, 69 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1523 (2001), the author suggests imposing a constructive trust on a
portion of the options for the benefit of the child as method of dealing with the
often indeterminate benefit available from the options. The portion would be de-
termined by the child support formula. Id. at 1564. However, the advantage of
the proposal seems to be lost by requiring some sort of "value" for the options to
be used in the formula in the first instance. Id. at 1564 n.335. Also, conceptually,
this approach undermines a basic objective of child support which is to provide
for the child's current needs. The approach might be more helpful where the op-
tion proceeds are intended to cover some future use, such as education.
103. See Otley v. Otley, 810 A.2d 1, 10-11 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (holding that
while the "comparable market" approach is available in some instances, the fact
that options usually are not divisible or transferable makes the "if, as, and when"
approach desirable). See also Mackinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d 680, 683 n.2
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (where the court accepted the possibility of using the "com-
parable market" approach, but appears to have overlooked the fact that the con-
ditions attached to options aimed at compensating a grantee usually are not
reflected in publicly traded warrants).
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hibit the employee from locking in the value of a grant by adopting
some hedging strategy, which in any event may be technically impos-
sible to do because of tax or expense considerations. Then, there is the
realm of closely-held corporations where the concept of a market value
is generally an artificial construct which may have little relationship
to reality,'0 4 at least as it relates to an obligor's ability to pay child
support. In general, both with closely-held corporations and publicly
traded entities, the grantee is likely to be holding an option package
which is aggressively hemmed in by conditions precedent and subse-
quent, and where even if the options can be exercised, the holders abil-
ity to realize value may be constrained by a restricted ability to
alienate the stock resulting from the exercise.10 5
It is against this background that we turn to the context where the
law seeks to identify income flowing from option schemes prior to the
scheme being cashed out. This process involves assigning a "value" to
the option.
There are a multitude of methods available for valuing options.
Prior to 1973 the predominant method for determining the value of an
option was to use a so-called empirical approach which involved at-
tempting to obtain the value by means of a regression analysis from
known data.10 6 While this method still has some following, at least in
certain circumstances, since the emergence in 1973 of the Black-
Scholes technique for valuing options, the predominant emphasis has
been on what are usually described as theoretical techniques for calcu-
lating option values. Many of the techniques trace their roots in some
respect or other to the Black-Scholes method,10 7 but then usually in-
104. In Mackinley, 814 A.2d at 683 n.2, the court acknowledged that in the absence of
a comparable market experts would be required to value the option which the
court, somewhat naively, remarked would be a "simple task."
105. As appears to be the case in In re Marriage of Palin, No. B146259, 2002 Cal. App.
Unpub. LEXIS 4318, *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2002). This case highlights the
need for care with the terminology in a particular context. Here "exercisability"
was the point at which the underlying stock could be purchased, "vesting" the
point at which the stock could be received. Since "exercisable" stock could still be
forfeited if not "vested," presumably, in most instances, rational employees did
nothing until the grant "vested." Even then, if "vested" stock were not "exercised"
within three months of termination of employment they would be lost. Id. at *6.
106. The Shelton model, see John P. Shelton, The Relation of the Price of a Warrant to
the Price of Its Associated Stock, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. May-June 1967, at 143,
July-Aug. 1967, at 88, and the Kassouf model, see Sheen Kassouf, A THEORY AND
AN ECONOMETRIC MODEL FOR COMMON STOCK PURCHASE WARRANTS (1965), are
examples of empirical techniques.
107. For a collection of material on the formula and its applications, see THE FINAN-
CIAL DERIVATIvEs READER (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992). For descriptions, which
may be more manageable, see William A. Raabe, Gerald E. Whittenburg, and
Martha Doran, Using the Black-Scholes Option Model in Tax Valuation, 2002
TNT 228-27 (November 26, 2002) and Damian Laurey, Untangling the Stock Op-
tion Cost Sharing Loophole, 55 TAx LAW. 761, 772-75 (2002).
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volve some embellishment or restructuring of the analysis in order to
deal with problems that the basic Black-Scholes technique has diffi-
culty with.108 Divorce courts have been offered various valuation
models over the last decade and a half or so, but, by and large, there
are only three techniques that seem to have made it out of the legal
starting-gate, and only one of these, in the absence of agreement be-
tween the parties, appears, in the reported decisions, to make it to the
finish line.
The three methods that the court has been willing to discuss in the
context of property division determinations are the Black-Scholes
method, the Binomial method, and using the Intrinsic Value of the
option. The Black-Scholes method attempts to value the options as
such, independently of the value of the underlying stock. The method
conceptually involves an effort to determine what it would cost to
hedge against anticipated oscillations in the future price of the under-
lying stock during the period the option remains open. To do this, the
technique relies on using the historical volatility of the shares. 109 Ac-
cordingly, the method breaks down when there is no or little evidence
of historical volatility, such as in closely-held corporations, or in corpo-
rations which, while publicly traded, are not traded widely. Even in
widely traded corporations, the model can run into trouble where
other factors can cause historical trading patterns to be unreliable.
This can occur with events like restructuring, acquisitions, or major
product line changes.11o Indeed, the basic Black-Scholes model even
has to be modified to handle dividend payments."' Although the
Black-Scholes model is widely used to value publicly traded options
and is a permissible valuation device in many circumstances for both
108. See, e.g., J. C. Cox & S.A. Ross, The Valuation of Options for Alternative Stochas-
tic Processes, J. FINANCIAL ECONOMICS 145 (1976) (CEV model); Robert C. Merton,
Option Pricing When Underlying Stock Returns Are Discontinuous, J. FINANCIAL
ECONOMICS 125 (1976) (Jump Diffusion model); Eric Noreen & Mark Wolfson,
Equilibrium Warrant Pricing Models and Accounting for Executive Stock Op-
tions, 19 J. OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH 384 (1981) (Noreen-Wolfson model).
109. In certain circumstances, namely where the option price is known, it may be pos-
sible to determine an "implied volatility". This can be obtained by performing a
reverse calculation using the option formula to determine what volatility factor
must have been used to reach the specified price. See LAWRENCE G. MCMILLAN,
OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT 411-12 (1986); Kimberly D. Krawiec, More
Than Just "New Financial Bingo". A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding De-
rivatives, 23 J. CORP. L. 1, 19-20 (1997). But, if no market price is available, the
investor has to rely on historical volatility information, if that is available, no
matter how inapplicable or unreliable it may be in the current circumstances, or
the investor has to estimate an "implied" volatility based on whatever informa-
tion or views the investor may have about future events.
110. See Fischer Black, Fact and Fantasy in the Use of Options, in THE FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES READER 184-85 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992).
111. Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
in THE FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES READER 157, 160, 168 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992).
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accountingl 1 2 and taxation purposes' 13 it has not found favor with di-
vorce courts. While the basic model is relatively easy to work with,
the underlying theory and mathematics would be intimidating to most
people - the judiciary included.
One of the difficulties with the Black-Scholes model is that for a
variety of reasons it does not perform well for the extended periods,
perhaps as long as a decade, that options created for compensation
purposes remain open. A valuation model that does better over longer
periods, and also offers somewhat more flexibility in dealing with non-
standard patterns of market behavior, is the Binomial method of valu-
ation. In principle, this method involves the technique of breaking
down the period the option is to remain open into a series of discrete
intervals and then working out what it would cost to hedge antici-
pated share price oscillations within each of those intervals. 114 Again,
the method depends on the availability of relevant information about
historical volatility. This method currently is acceptable to the ac-
counting profession, but again has not found favor with divorce courts.
Perhaps, here too, the theoretical and mathematical underpinnings
have proved overwhelming.
One method of valuing options that has found judicial favor for the
purposes of property division on divorce is the so-called Intrinsic
Value method. 115 Here, the value that is assigned to the options is the
difference between the exercise price of the options and the current
market value of the underlying corporate stock.116 With this method,
concerns about mathematics and theory magically disappear and are
reduced to simple concerns with arithmetic. But, despite its simplic-
ity, the technique displays some major warts. First, the date picked
112. Currently, the Financial Accounting Standards Board allows corporations the
choice of reporting compensation options as an expense or just disclosing the op-
tion value in a footnote. For the latter purpose, a valuation method is acceptable
if it takes into account the stock price at the date of the grant, the exercise price,
the expected life of the option, the volatility of the underlying stock, expected
dividends and risk free interest rates over the life of the option. Both variants of
the Black-Scholes formula and the Binomial method will meet these require-
ments. See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT-
ING STANDARDS No. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION 4-7,
11-22 (1995).
113. Raabe, Whittenburg, & Doran, supra note 107.
114. J. C. Cox, S. A. Ross, & M. Rubinstein, Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach, 7
J. FIN. ECON. 229 (1979).
115. See, e.g., Davidson v. Davidson, 254 Neb. 656, 668-69, 578 N.W.2d 848, 858
(1998).
116. See Mackinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d 680, 683 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(court imputing the intrinsic value of the option to the holder as "income" for the
purpose of calculating child support). The dissent in this case highlights one of
the difficulties with the intrinsic value method, namely, that the court has to pick
a specific date for valuing the underlying stock which could produce results based
on "the daily vagaries of the stock market." Id. at 685.
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for determining the underlying stock price becomes critical and the
result can be totally arbitrary in a volatile market.117 Second, the
technique fails to take into account the fact that the essence of an op-
tion is an entitlement to acquire stock at some time within the period
that the option remains open. This is a valuable right, more valuable
the further off the expiry date of the option is, and that value is not
reflected in the difference between the exercise price and the stock
price.118 Finally, and this criticism can be applied to all three meth-
ods of valuation just outlined, there is no guarantee that the option
holder can extract the assigned value.
An option holder actually will be able to extract the value assigned
to an option by the Intrinsic Value method, if, first, the option is free
to be exercised and second, the resulting stock actually can be sold at
the assigned market price, transaction costs aside. Accordingly, if the
options are not vested, in the sense of not exercisable, the Intrinsic
Value assigned is artificial. 119 In practice the same result may follow
if the option holder lacks the resources to pay the exercise price. 1 20
117. In Francesco v. Francesco, No. FA990171592S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1349
(Conn. Super. Ct. May 19, 2000), the option holder's assets fluctuated $20 million
during the week of the trial and the option holder filed new financial affidavits
daily.
118. For one thing, the grantee does not have capital tied up during this period - be-
yond the purchase price (in cash or labor) of the option itself. Also, the holder has
a limited downside risk if the stock price falls below the option exercise price. See
David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of In-
centive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 440, 448-49 (2000).
119. That does not mean that it will be unacceptable to a court. See Green v. Green,
494 A.2d 721, 728-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
120. There are substantial issues of liquidity involved. Not only is there the question
of the exercise price itself, but with the exception of so-called Incentive Stock
Options (as they are understood by Internal Revenue Code section 422), the fact
of exercise itself triggers a tax liability of the option holder on the difference be-
tween the exercise price and the market value of the underlying stock. This tax
is on ordinary income basis. When the underlying stock is finally sold there is a
further tax liability on the difference between the market value of the stock at the
time of exercise and the market value at the time of sale. This latter transaction
can be accorded capital gains treatment. Accordingly, in principle, in the first
instance, the grantee has to come up with the exercise price of the stock and the
tax arising from the exercise. Historically, a favored technique was for the em-
ployer to provide the employee a bridge loan to cover the period from the time of
exercise until the underlying stock could be sold. See, e.g., Franco v. Franco, 81
S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tex. App. 2002). The stock would then be sold and the proceeds
used to cover both the exercise price and the tax liability. However, at least with
respect to certain employers and certain employees, such loans are now prohib-
ited by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Rosettenstein, supra note 53. Also, with
greater concern about the propriety of decoupling employees from the risk associ-
ated with incentive compensation packages, corporate employers are increasingly
reluctant to allow the sale of the stock obtained on the exercise of the option. Id.
These sorts of considerations may make it difficult for the employee to either
liquidate the holding or even to use the holding as collateral in order to secure a
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The Intrinsic Value also may be artificial even if the option can be
exercised, if the resulting stock cannot be sold, because of employer,
SEC, or stock market restrictions on alienation. Alienation restric-
tions are particularly problematic because such limitations seem in-
creasingly likely to occur in the present market climate. 12 1
With the Black-Scholes and Binomial methods the same problem of
value extraction arises, but for a different reason. With these meth-
ods the assigned value is the value of the option itself. Importantly
too, these techniques do not automatically supply a figure for the ulti-
mate benefit that will enure to the option holder. Accordingly, we
need to refine our conceptual analysis. Presumably, technically, the
employees compensation is the value of the option itself. And if the
option itself could be disposed of it may be appropriate to designate
this amount as the employee's "income". However, not infrequently,
the ultimate benefit to the employee is from exercising the option and
selling the underlying stock. These would be the resources to look to
in order to meet the child support, obligation imposed by virtue of the
"income" from the option. So, if disposing of the option itself is not a
possibility, using the "intrinsic value" notionally may be an appropri-
ate measure of "income" even if it is not theoretically really the income
received by the employee which, as was just indicated, conceptually is
the value of the option itself. Also, comfortingly, the enhancement in
value reflected in the Intrinsic Value method is a benefit the holder
derives by way of compensation and so is in a sense "income." In any
event, to extract the value assigned by the Black-Scholes and Bino-
mial methods, the holder has to be able to alienate the option itself
which requires both the right to alienate and an available market at
the assigned value. As was indicated, options received by way of com-
pensation routinely are not transferable, and even if they were, ordi-
narily they would be encumbered with conditions that would not
match their public market analogs, even if the latter were trading at a
Black-Scholes formula based price.
In summary, the techniques which divorce courts are willing to
contemplate for the purposes of property division may be capable of
generating a value for an option grant, but there is a high likelihood
that the generated value does not represent actual extractable cash.
This difficulty can lead to two kinds of problems when it comes to fix-
ing child support orders. First, if we assume for the moment that the
loan. Accordingly, it may be difficult to make the transition from the value as-
signed to the option for income determination purposes to the point where cash
can be realized for meeting the child support obligation flowing from the assigned
value, notwithstanding assumptions by the courts to the contrary. See Mack-
inley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d 680, 683 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that
an option holder not wishing to exercise the option can meet child support obliga-
tions by securing a loan using the options as collateral).
121. See Rosettenstein, supra note 53.
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"value" of the option is to be treated as "income" for the purposes of
fixing the child support order, there is a real possibility that the obli-
gor will be treated as having an "income" where that "income" is an
artificial construct. Indeed, if the options aren't vested, or if vested
they cannot be traded, or if vested and even exercised, if the resulting
stock cannot be sold, then the obligor will be treated as having income
when in fact he or she does not have any income at all. Second, there
is a real risk that a court might be comfortable with the notion that it
can fix a child support order based on these formulae derived values,
because the obligor has other liquid resources with which to meet any
resulting child support order. The court may assume that in due
course the conditions attached to the options will be discharged and
the assigned value realized. Of course, this may be far from reality.
With all this analysis behind us we now will take a look at what the
courts in fact have done.
IV. THE CASES
A. Introduction
Because of federal mandates every state has in place some form of
guideline structure for the determination of child support. 122 Al-
though notionally this structure exists in an area involving the trial
court's discretion, it has been recognized that in reality one is dealing
with a highly regulated area of law where very often the discretion
that is permitted the court is one that flows from statute or regula-
tion.123 Generally, the calculation of child support requires the injec-
tion of data into a predetermined formula which generates a
presumptively appropriate award.124 Often, states permit a depar-
ture from the guidelines in a variety of circumstances which may be
more or less closely circumscribed by statute or regulation. That said,
however, very few state statutes or regulations deal directly with
stock options in the process of determining child support. Accordingly,
state courts have to confront issues of whether it is appropriate to con-
sider options at all, and, if so, how options should be taken into ac-
count. In particular, once the decision has been made that options are
relevant to the determination of child support, the courts have to
wrestle with the issue of how to determine the amount of income that
122. 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (2003).
123. See Cheriton v. Cheriton (In re Marriage of Cheriton), 111 Cal. Rptr. 755, 765
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). This case is subjected to a detailed analysis in Susan Isard,
Note, Stock Options and Child Support: The Price of Accuracy, 14 HASTINGS WO-
MEN'S L. J. 215 (2003).
124. These calculations processes have not been met with universal judicial approval.
One California court described that state's formula as involving a system which
"is a kind of hybrid of quantum physics and Zen philosophy." In re Marriage of
Schulze, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488, 492 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
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can be used in the formula, whether there is a distinction between
looking towards options as a source of income and looking to the op-
tions as a resource out of which any otherwise determined support
obligation can be met, and whether the essentially unique characteris-
tics of options in themselves justify departing from a presumptively
valid formula determination. These themes and others will be visited
in due course
B. Interests to be Advanced
The cases recognize that the decision on whether to include options
in any analysis for the purposes of child support is influenced by a
broad sweep of policy considerations. First, the argument goes, op-
tions should be includable in income because otherwise we run the
risk that the employee will chose to be compensated with options.
This would defeat the goal of minimizing the economic consequences
of divorce for children and specifically potentially deprive the child of
a standard of living equal to that of the petitioner's subsequent fam-
ily.12 5 Then, an option holder should not have the ability to prevent
his children from having the benefit of possibly the most important
element of his yearly compensation. Moreover, shielding income from
the courts and depriving children of the standard of living they other-
wise would have enjoyed would be contrary to the purpose of child
support statues which is advancing the child's best interests. 126 Fur-
ther, the other parent and the child should not be burdened as a result
of individual choices to invest for the future in lieu of a current bene-
fit,127 presumably even if that choice is otherwise legitimate. On the
other hand, requiring a court to evaluate the legitimacy of investment
decisions may be burdensome.128 Finally, the entire analysis requires
the court to deal with a financial instrument that does not lend itself
to rote application of general principles. Accordingly, the litigation
process can become complex, protracted and inefficient.
C. Options As "Income"
It is quite possible, of course, that in certain contexts the litigants
might have on opportunity to provide their own definition of "in-
come."129 Thus, a divorce agreement might itself provide for future
125. In re Dolan, 786 A.2d 820, 824 (N.H. 2001).
126. Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999)
127. Clark v. Clark, 779 A.2d 42, 54-56 (Vt. 2001) (Johnson J., dissenting).
128. Clark, 779 A.2d at 47. The dissent's view was that the burden was no greater
than that required to impute income to the unemployed or underemployed which
was something the court already did. Id. at 57 (Johnson J., dissenting).
129. See Frazier v. Frazier, 72 S.W.3d 333, 334 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (addressing a
marriage settlement that excluded income from the realization of stock options
for the purposes of calculating future increases in child support). Pafties implic-
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contributions or modifications based on the parties' respective "in-
comes." In the event of the parties failing to provide their own defini-
tion, the court will have to come up with a construction of its own,
which might include determining whether or not to take into account
the proceeds of stock options. 130 One obvious fallback position for the
court is to adopt the state's 13 1 guideline definition of income,13 2 since
doing so immediately would enable the court to evaluate the sub-
stance of the parties agreement against the mandates of the
guidelines.
Not infrequently, state definitions of "income" for the purposes of
determining child support adopt a broad brush approach along the
lines of "income" means "income from whatever source".133 After un-
helpful circular definitions of this type, the statutes, or regulations,
then proceed to a set of representative examples which usually are
indicated as not being exhaustive. This leaves the courts to make in-
dividualized determinations as to whether a particular form of benefit,
resource, or advantage, can be taken into account.' 3 4 Thus, the court
itly have even used the expansive definition of"income" in a child support statute
to define the spousal support obligation in a settlement agreement. See Forsythe
v. Forsythe, 41 Va. Cir. 82, 84-5 (1996).
130. See generally Laura W. Morgan, Update: Stock Options as Income for Purposes of
Child Support (Jan. 2002), available at http://supportguidelines.com/articles/
art200201.html; Laura Wish Morgan, Stock Options as "Income" for Support,
Support Guidelines.com (Dec. 1999), available at httpJ/www.childsupportguide-
lines.com/articles/artl99912.html.
131. In an inter-state context it is possible that the result may be determined by the
prior application of the law of another state. See Frazier, 72 S.W.3d at 335-38
(using the doctrine of res judicata to cap a previously litigated Illinois order cap-
ping child support obligation at $50,000 per year and excluding proceeds from the
realization of stock options from the formula to be used in calculating child
support).
132. As was done in Tariff v. Tariff, No. 233425, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3265, at *6
(Conn. Super. Ct. March 29, 1996). However the court adjusted the guideline's
definition of "income" to take account of alimony paid and received because the
concept of "income" was to be used to determine the parties' obligation towards
the "extreme expense of college". Id. The court excluded from the income calcula-
tion stock options held by one of the parties because they were "not a source of
present disposable income". Id., at *7. It is not clear whether this means that
they were not vested, that they had not been exercised, that the underlying stock
was subject to restrictions, or that they were simply "under water".
133. See, e. g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(a) (West 2004).
134. Thus, California courts have made the determination that predictable overtime
and bonuses are relevant, as is the value of rent-free housing, the availability of a
company car and a parent-employer's rent subsidy, lottery winnings and an in-
heritance. But these courts excluded gifts and student loans. See Cheriton v.
Cheriton (In re Marriage of Cheriton), 111 Cal. Rptr. 755, 766-76 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001). A Delaware court saw options as analogous to a bonus which was specifi-
cally mentioned in the statute and thus covered by the general statutory phrase,
"any form of payment made by the obligor's employer." See Kenton v. Kenton,
571 A.2d 778, 782-83 (Del. 1990). An Arizona court held that stock options consti-
2004]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:947
might conclude that "this additional income is part of his overall em-
ployment compensation and must be used to calculate child sup-
port."135 Once over this hurdle, the court can encounter the nuanced
distinction that although the employee may have been compensated
by options, he or she is not is not currently receiving options and may
not receive any in the future.13 6 This opens up further lines of analy-
sis. First, to what extent should options awarded in the past, as dis-
tinct from post-divorce grants, 13 7 be included in the child support
determination. One of the major sources of difficulty in this regard
arises, not, as one might anticipate, from options provided by the em-
tuted a "non-cash benefit" under the state's statutory definition of"gross income"
and thus could be used in calculating child support under the guidelines once a
value had been assigned to the options. See Robinson v. Thiel (In re Marriage of
Robinson), 35 P.3d 89, 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). In New Hampshire, options were
found to be covered for reasons of policy. See In re Dolan, 786 A.2d 820, 823 (N.H.
2001). In West Virginia, the Supreme Court found that the statutory concept of
"gross income" included moneys received from the exercise of stock options be-
cause there was no statutory basis for excluding such funds. W. Virginia ex rel
Dep't of Health and Human Res. v. Baker, 557 S.E.2d 267, 271 (W. Va. 2001).
135. Kerr v. Kerr (In re Marriage of Kerr), 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 380 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999). The full implications of this must be understood. On this analysis the
mere fact that an individual holds options does not automatically mean that the
individual is in possession of "income". Thus, one case drew the distinction be-
tween options which were part of a compensation package and options which the
other spouse had received by way of a property division settlement, even though
she had cashed out the options and they were treated as taxable income to her.
See Cheriton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769; see also Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d
288, 294-95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (electing not to take pre-divorce options into
account for child support purposes because they were dealt with as marital prop-
erty). However, this analysis should not be pushed too far. Options received by
way of compensation, clearly are "income". This does not mean that options not
received or held by way of compensation are not income. Indeed, the Court in
Cheriton conducted a facts and circumstances analysis that was somewhat disin-
genuous in its efforts to preclude the options held and exercised by the wife from
being included in her income for support determination purposes. Id. The prob-
lem that this court had arose, presumably, from the fact that options inherently
travel with the potential for dual classification. That is, they can be classified as
either income or assets, see Robinson, 35 P.3d at 93; Seither v. Seither, 779 So. 2d
331, 332-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Dolan, 786 A.2d at 823-24, and the court
was trying to find a safe harbor in some circumstances, while precluding obligors
from always having a safe harbor merely by virtue of holding options.
It is worthwhile remembering that the above analysis will be conducted in the
context of some statutory umbrella. This means that what is good for the goose is
not necessarily also good for the gander. Thus, while option receipts may be "in-
come" for the purposes of child support they may not amount to "earnings" for the
purposes of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2003). Thus,
lump sum payments derived from the termination of an employee stock option
plan may not be subject to the garnishment limits in the federal statute. See
Colwell v. Jones, No. 14528, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 3189 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 1,
1990).
136. See Cheriton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 768.
137. See Kerr, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 377.
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ployer, but in connection with options distributed in the divorce by
way of property division. The argument is made from time-to-time
that such a distribution precludes "double-dipping" in the form of then
using the options to establish a child support obligation. 138 This argu-
ment certainly does have validity in the context of spousal support,
where except in special circumstances,139 options left in one spouse's
hands may not be treated as generating income for spousal support
purposes. 140 The analysis in the case of child support might, however,
be somewhat different. The child never gets the "first dip." Accord-
ingly, if one or both spouses end up with options the options should
certainly be available as a resource from which an obligation could be
met. However, ordinarily the options should not be used as a basis for
determining the holder's "income"141 unless the value that was as-
signed to them in the property division phase is less than the value
the options currently have (using the same valuation technique), in
which case the additional value could be treated as income. 14 2 How-
ever, "could" is not the same as "should." Thus, some jurisdictions
have held that the extraction of value from the options at a later date
represents no more than the conversion of an asset and thus should
not be considered income,14 3 even if there has been appreciation in the
value of the underlying asset since the divorce.144 The problem with
this perspective is that it appears to fail to recognize that a former
spouse will have received offsetting value at the time of the divorce, in
particular, a value which presumably recognized that the options
might appreciate. This should preclude him or her from asserting
138. See Robinson, 35 P.3d at 96; Rinner v. Rinner, No. M2001-02307-COA-R3-CV,
2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2003).
139. See Hokin v. Hokin (In re Marriage of Hokin), 605 N.W.2d 219, 230 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999) (holding a share of pension funds distributed to a claimant could be used to
impute income to her because a considerably older husband at age seventy-four
could be anticipated to retire relatively soon, so court was doing what would
likely have happened in the ordinary course of events, absent divorce).
140. See, e.g., Hamlin v. Hamlin (In re Marriage of Hamlin), No. CO-93-676, 1993
Minn. App. LEXIS 1113, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 1993) (finding that the
since statute authorized maintenance payment from "future income or earnings,"
stock options divided in a property settlement were not available to support a
maintenance obligation).
141. The analysis may be further complicated by the fact that after receiving options
by way of property division pursuant to the divorce the recipient then has her
alimony award terminated. See Hansel v. Hansel, 2000-1914 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/
21/01), 802 So.2d 875, 882.
142. See Stacey v. Stacey, No. 02A01-9802-CV-00050, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668, at
*10 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1999). But see Southerland v. Southerland, 58
S.W.3d 867, 870 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that post-divorce appreciated value
of options akin to marital asset that appreciated after the divorce rather than
bonus income subject to a 15% child support "top-up" element in an existing sup-
port order).
143. See Denley v. Denley, 661 A.2d. 628, 631 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
144. Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 772, 775 (Ga. 1997).
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that the appreciation was income for the purpose of alleging a change
in circumstances that justifies modifying an alimony award. But, this
logic does not extend to child support, because, as was just suggested,
the child never got the underlying offsetting value in the first place.
Care should be taken. A perspective which allows the exercise of an
option to be viewed as generating "income" may go too far, if it allows
the total net proceeds to be included as income in the support calcula-
tion,14 5 rather than what seems to be the more equitable approach of
limiting "income" to the net realized appreciation since the divorce.
This perspective would be undermined by acknowledging that a role of
child support goes beyond mere support of the child but also is aimed
at benefitting the residential parent, in which case that parent's fore-
closure on a modification of alimony should also, at least to some ex-
tent, extend to child support.
Notice that if an analysis like that just outlined is not employed, it
becomes very difficult to maintain a distinction that options granted
before the divorce are ineligible for calculating child support, while
those granted after the divorce can be treated as "income" for award
purposes. This is particularly true if an intrinsic valuation method is
is used to determine income. But not all courts need despair.
A jurisdiction with an appropriate jurisprudential foundation
might be able to duck any option appreciation issue using a technique
employed in a case involving support obligations to an out-of-wedlock
child. The court held that, while the exercise of the options might con-
stitute a change in circumstances, since the existence of the obliga-
tions was discussed at the original child support hearings, the change
in circumstances was a change contemplated at the time of the origi-
nal order and this could preclude modification of the order under the
jurisdiction's rules.14 6
145. See Ayyad v. Rashid (In re Marriage of Ayyad), 38 P.3d 1033, 1037 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002). This case gives the claimant two bites at the apple. The proceeds of
exercised options are to be considered income, but unexercised, query unvested,
options can be included in a determination of the obligor's wealth which itself
may then justify a deviation from the guidelines. Id. At the trial court level the
court had concluded that since the proceeds from exercising the options merely
had been shifted to other investments and had not contributed to a substantial
increase in the obligor's standard of living, the exercise of the options should not
be included in the income calculation. Id.
146. Yost v. Unanue, 671 N.E.2d 1374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). This approach appears to
be required by Ohio statute. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.215(b)(4) (2003);
Maio v. Maio, No. 2000-L-073, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3927, *7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Aug. 31, 2001). The argument, of course, cannot be made in a jurisdiction where
the standard for modification of existing orders is something other than a change
in circumstances. See Stacey v. Stacey, No . 02A01-9802-CV-00050, 1999 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 668, at *5 (using the standard of whether there is a significant vari-
ance between what the guidelines would require and the amount previously or-
dered if this variance is not due to a court ordered deviation unless that deviation
is no longer justified). In some jurisdictions a claimant may end up in a procedu-
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Within the context of deciding whether options should be consid-
ered part of an obligor's income, courts have had to consider whether
the fact that options are not awarded on a consistent basis,147 but only
sporadically 148 and, perhaps unpredictably, means that options as a
resource class should not be considered in the calculation of the sup-
port obligation.149 Some courts have seen an analogy with bonuses
and overtime, which can be taken into account for child support pur-
poses. In this endeavor they may be aided by statutory provisions
which enable the court to adjust the award if the guideline-produced
figure does not match the actual or prospective income of the parties
or where it is necessary to do so to accommodate fluctuating in-
come. 150 While such provisions superficially are helpful, in and of
themselves they give no insight into whether this adjustment can be
made prospectively. Although, presumably this was contemplated.
But, if so, how is this adjustment to be made? Moreover, even if the
ral trap for other reasons. Thus, Texas will not allow a child support order to be
modified to take into account options that were not previously considered on the
basis that this amounts to an unauthorized retroactive modification of child sup-
port. See In re C. J., No. 05-98-01973-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3067, at *6 n.3
(Tex. App. May 10, 2001). This probably was not the situation that the federal
government or the state legislature had in mind when retroactive modification
was prohibited! The Vermont legislature requires that the change in circum-
stances be "unanticipated." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 660(a) (2003). Presumably,
the parties will always anticipate that the options will be exercised at some point
which means that some order will have to be made at the outset. But how is this
to occur if the actual amount to be realized is not known, especially if the jurisdic-
tion does not permit an award of a predetermined percentage? The "variance"
language used in Tennessee, as described above, would seem to be of some help in
this regard, since it would only require that what the obligor had amounted to
"income" and then whether that "income" produced a significant "variance" from
the previously ordered obligation.
147. In contrast to the situation in Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 293, 295 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1999), where the evidence was that the options were awarded annually
and constituted "recurring, sustainable compensation" which the obligor could
expect to receive so long as the obligor continued to work in his position.
148. See, e.g., In re Dolan, 786 A.2d 820, 824 (N.H. 2001).
149. Thus, Ohio specifically excluded from its guideline calculations any "nonrecur-
ring or unsustainable income or cash flow item", which in turn was defined to be
income which the parent receives for any period not to exceed three years which
the parent does not expect to continue to receive on a regular basis. Interest-
ingly, the concept also provided that the receipt would be included in income if it
could be invested or utilized to produce income for a period of more than three
years. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3113.215(A)(11) (2003). See Murray, 716 N.E.2d
at 292.
150. See Cheriton v. Cheriton (In re Marriage of Cheriton), 111 Cal. Rptr. 755, 768
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (citing CAL. FAm. CODE §§ 4060, 4064 (West 2004)). The
court in this case, somewhat unhelpfully, slid past the fact that it relied on an
authority dealing with predictable overtime and bonuses. Id. Some option




provisions allow adjustment with hindsight, how are the risks of a
non-modifiable accumulated arrearage to be accommodated?1 5 1
Assuming one is willing to consider options as "income" for the pur-
poses of determining the amount of support due under the state's
guidelines, the character of option grants tend to throw up another
analytical roadblock. In principle, the determination of whether an
individual has relevant "income" is a time-specific issue. An obligor
may have had income in the past, may currently be in receipt of in-
come or may be expecting income in the future. All of these may be
relevant to our concerns, but our analysis and understanding has to be
premised on the foundation that income involves the concept of time
specific receipts. As we saw, options give the employee the right to
acquire stock at some point in the future by exercising the option.
Suppose the options are freely exercisable at the moment of grant. Is
this when the grantee receives "income"? If that is the case, then,
since options conventionally are granted at the current market price
of the underlying stock, there will be no net "income" to the grantee.
Does such an approach then innoculate the grantee from future obli-
gations once the options are in fact exercised? This seems to be an
undesirable position to take, yet its logical consequence does exist.
Courts do take the position that the employee will be treated as hav-
ing income when the grantee has exercisable options which he or she
declines to exercise. 152 The argument is that the employee is now
making an investment choice which the grantee should not be free to
do to the detriment of his or her child support obligations.153 In es-
sence, the argument is that when the grantee exercises the option the
151. Indeed, a Court of Appeal in California has held that since modification is predi-
cated on a demonstration of a change in circumstances courts are not able to
anticipate what might happen and provide for future contingencies. See Cher-
iton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776-77 (rejecting a trial court scheme for a computer-
ized adjustment of child support based on an annual exchange of tax returns).
But see Kenton v. Kenton, 571 A.2d 778, 781 (Del. 1990) (finding a prospective
mechanism for recalculation acceptable). This type of situation only enhances
the risk that a non-modifiable arrearage will be accumulated. On the other hand
it might be possible for the parties by agreement, or the court by order, to de-
scribe a mechanism for recalculation of the award in the light of changed circum-
stances where the arrangement would not be construed as a retroactive
modification. See Kenton, 571 A.2d at 781.
152. See, e.g., Mackinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d 680, 683 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
153. Robinson v. Thiel (In re Marriage of Robinson), 35 P.3d 89, 94 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001); Murray, 716 N.E.2d at 294-95. This issue may not be as straightforward
as might appear. What approach should the court adopt if certain classes of in-
vestment trigger an employer "match"? See Robinson v. Robinson, Nos. 16613,
16614, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2068, at *19 (Ohio Ct. App. May 8, 1998) (address-
ing a claim that pay reduction in the form of contributions to a 401(K) plan was
justified because of employer match). Should the court, at least constructively,
require the employee to turn his or her back on this match in order to provide
immediate "income" for child support calculation purposes?
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grantee acquires underlying stock at, presumably, a discounted price
and this is the moment when the employee realizes income. 1 54 How-
ever, in truth, at this moment no funds flow in. In the instance where
the employee even fails to exercise the option, since we are dealing
with the issue of whether to impute income, the fact that the employee
fails to get income because the options aren't exercised, never mind
the resulting stock sold, just adds another layer of fiction. The reality
is that the process attributes the income that would be received if the
option were both exercised and the stock sold.155 Thus, at least this
154. The judicial analysis is sometimes complicated by a failure to distinguish "in-
come" as the concept is understood for child support purposes, and "income" as it
is understood under tax law. Under federal tax law, unless we are dealing with a
so-called Incentive Stock Option (ISO), which is regulated by Internal Revenue
Code (hereinafter "IRC") § 422, the grantee first is treated as having taxable in-
come when he or she exercises the option. IRC § 83(a) (2003). With an ISO the
grantee only has a taxable event when the stock resulting from the exercise of the
option is finally sold and this event is taxed on a capital gains basis. Under
§ 83(a) the exercise is treated as the receipt of compensation and is taxed on an
ordinary income basis. Thus, other than in the case of an ISO, tax law allows an
individual to be liable for tax even though the taxpayer is not in receipt of actual
funds. In the case of an ISO there may be a marginal increase in tax burden
without the receipt of proceeds if the exercise of the ISO triggers alternative min-
imum tax treatment under IRC § 56(b)(3). There does not seem to be a compel-
ling necessity to axiomatically follow the tax rule in determining when there is
income for child support purposes. See Kenton, 571 A.2d at 782 n.5. To do so
could lead the grantee to be in a position of having to pay both taxes and child
support without the automatic ability to generate the necessary funds. Obviously,
this argument becomes less compelling if the grantee is in a position to sell the
stock resulting from the exercise, subject of course to the understanding that this
latter step may generate a capital gain liability. This leads to a further tax-re-
lated issue that needs to be recognized, namely the extent to which tax obliga-
tions reduce the "income" identifiable as flowing from the options. Technically
this issue will hinge on how the state guidelines are constructed, but it is appro-
priate to recognize that the grantee ultimately only has post-tax resources availa-
ble to meet his or her obligations. See Cheriton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769 n.9.
As was just noted, tax laws may produce a tax liability on exercise even
though no funds are generated. Accordingly, grantees who seek to have no "in-
come" recognized for child support purposes until the internal Revenue Code rec-
ognizes "income" may be doing themselves a disservice. See Mackinley, 814 A.2d
at 682 n.1. In this case the grantee argued that income for support purposes
should be identified when the option was exercised on the basis that this was the
point when the Code recognized income. Hopefully, in pursuing this position the
grantee knew, at least in her case, that after exercise the underlying stock read-
ily could be alienated. In any event the court rejected the plea because the court
saw the underlying interests as those of the child, not those of tax policy, and
following the tax code would have enabled the grantee to defer using the re-
sources to determine her support obligations.
155. In Kenton, 571 A.2d at 783, the Delaware Supreme Court said that the fact that
the exercise of options produced a non-cash asset was an equitable consideration
which had to be taken into account in deciding whether there had been a rebuttal
of the presumption that the mathematical result produced by application of the
guideline formula should constitute the order. In particular, the court said that if
20041 989
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
method should not be employed if the underlying stock cannot be sold
even if the options can be exercised. 156 Or, turning the analysis
around, the better argument is that income only is realized when the
underlying stock is sold, or at least could be sold?157 This is perhaps
the moment to remember that option grant structures contain a vari-
ety of benchmarks not all of which are necessarily under the em-
ployee's control. The options may not be able to be exercised for some
period of time,158 or even when exercised, the resulting stock may not
be able to be sold until some point in the future. It would seem inap-
propriate to saddle an obligor with a liability based upon something
the obligor had other resources from which adequate child support could be paid,
the obligor should not be required to liquidate the stock for the purposes of pay-
ing even more support. Additionally, the court noted that a paper profit was gen-
erated as "income"for tax purposes when the options were exercised, but that
"income" was to be excluded from the guideline formula. Id. In summary, the
court actually seems to be setting up a structural preference to include in the
guideline formula only "income" generated once the underlying stock is sold.
That is, that income should not be imputed to the obligor simply for the purposes
of enhancing otherwise adequate support. However, the court did note that the
equitable balance could change as the child's needs change through minority. Id.
156. As in Hayden v. Hayden, No.FA93-0113097, 1995 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1967, at
*6 (Conn. Super Ct. June 8, 1995), where the exercise of the options produced
restricted stock that could not be sold for two years. Indeed, the parties' financial
position worsened as a result of the exercise, at least for a period of time, because
the employee spouse was compelled to exercise the options when his employment
terminated, on pain of losing them. He had to borrow money to fund the exercise.
The loan was from a relative and apparently did not carry an interest obligation.
But if it had, would a child support obligation permit the exercise of the options if
the effect of any loan interest was to reduce the revenue available for a child
support obligation? Even if a net benefit was expected when the underlying stock
could be sold, should the risk of a downturn in the stock price and the potential
inability to pay the loan be permitted in the face of child support obligation? In
any event, in most instances, the evil deed will already be done at the time the
court faces the consequences, so that the issue will usually boil down to one of
whether it is appropriate to impute income to the obligor.
157. See Cheriton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 769 ("At the very latest.., income is realized
when the underlying stock is sold for gain."). It is not clear that courts fully un-
derstand the potential difficulties. Thus, in Mackinley, 814 A.2d at 683 n.2, the
court said that an option holder "would have no difficulty in accomplishing the
purchase and sale in a single transaction." Even if that was true in the circum-
stances of that particular case it is not universally true, particularly at a point in
time when stockholders are increasingly concerned to keep option grantees ex-
posed to the same risks as investors. See Rosettenstein, supra note 53.
158. See Robinson v. Thiel (In re Marriage of Robinson), 35 P.3d 89, 93 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001).
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that he or she has not received159 and the receipt of which he or she is
no position to expedite.160
Seemingly, in some acknowledgment to the above discussion, there
are courts which appear to take the position that there is no income
for consideration until the options actually are exercised. 16 1 Then,
there are courts which take the position that it "is not the role of the
159. The lack of control may be illusory and courts are concerned not to allow the
obligor to "hide behind the shield of corporate business decisions" where the effect
of doing so is to prevent a child from enjoying the standard of living which the
child would have enjoyed if the marriage had continued. See Murray, 716 N.E.2d
at 293.
160. In New Hampshire, the position would seem to be that this sort of problem can be
dealt with under the statutory authority to adjust awards dictated by the support
guidelines where the application of the guidelines would result in a "confiscatory
support order." See In re Dolan, 786 A.2d 820, 824 (N.H. 2001). Interestingly,
the New Hampshire court revisited this decision, in passing, in the course of its
decision in In re Valence, 798 A.2d 35, 38 (N. H. 2002), where it took the position
that for child support purposes "the gain recognized upon exercising the stock
options is properly viewed as income" and is "properly included when calculating
a parent's child support obligation." At a technical level this comment is confus-
ing. No "gain" is realized when an option is "exercised." The gain occurs when
the underlying stock is sold. Was the court confused by the fact that there is
taxable event when non-qualified options are exercised, and did it assume that
this was a tax on a "gain", although it is technically a tax on compensation and is
taxed as ordinary income? Was the court thinking that the taxable amount
should be treated as income, even if the option holder receives nothing at that
moment in time? Perhaps the court is comfortable with the idea that because
there is already one obligation to meet with no funds in hand, there is not prob-
lem with adding an additional burden. Of course the obligor may be in a position
to immediately realize the "gain" by selling the underlying stock, but in this day
and age that should not be treated as a certainty. But, perhaps the court's lan-
guage was just a little loose. It may be that it meant that the "gain" and the
income became manifest when the underlying stock was sold or at least could be
sold. The position is made even more obscure because the Supreme Court in Do-
lan appears to let stand the trial court's approach of determining the obligor's
income; an approach which reduced the "value" of the exercised stock options by
twenty percent to reflect the capital gains tax rate. Dolan, 786 A.2d at 822. If
the option scheme involved Incentive Stock options, as recognized by I. R. C.
§ 422, the use of a capital gains rate is appropriate, but this type of option scheme
is one which specifically requires minimum retention periods of the option and
the resulting stock in order to get this rate, making it even less likely that the
obligor would actually be in receipt of funds when the income was attributed to
him or her. Some clarification from the New Hampshire Supreme Court would
be helpful.
161. See In re Marriage of Campbell, 905 P.2d 19, 20 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). This ap-
proach at a simplistic level also avoids problems with quantifying the income. It
simply can be "limited to the difference between his purchase price of the op-
tioned stock and the price at which he then sold [the stock.]" Id., at 21; see also
Yost v. Unanue, 671 N.E.2d 1374 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). Here, the court held that
a child support obligation established after a paternity action would not have a
claim to "income" with respect to options held by the obligor until such time as
the value of underlying stock exceeded the exercise price of the options and the
grantee sold the stock. Id. at 1376.
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judiciary to second guess personal investment decisions or to micro-
manage investment portfolios"; even while the court seeks to preserve
a second bite at the apple by recognizing that there may be circum-
stances where it is appropriate to require 162 a parent to reinvest or
liquidate certain assets to provide for his or her children.16 3 The un-
162. A rather bizarre effort in this direction was attempted by the trial court in Mack-
inley, 814 A.2d at 681. This court chose not to include the mother's vested but
unexercised options in her "income", but required the mother to exercise the op-
tions at some point "during the children's minority." Id. In the event that she did
not do so, the father was authorized to petition the court for enforcement.
Clearly, the prospects of the mother legitimately being held in contempt may be
limited. The window might even be restricted to twenty four hours, or less, un-
less the term "children" is taken at face value.
163. Clark v. Clark, 779 A.2d 42, 46 (Vt. 2001). In this case, which did not deal with
stock options, the father sought to impute income to the mother's under-perform-
ing investments and to her decision to maintain inheritances in the trusts in
which she had received them. The court felt that to have to carefully examine
investments in each case would be overly burdensome. Id. at 47. The Vermont
statute also did not authorize the court to impute income, except where the assets
were "nonincome producing", as distinct from poorly performing. VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15 § 653 (5)(A)(I) (2003). The dissent saw this as providing parents with an
opportunity to invest in growth assets while insulating the assets from being con-
sidered for child support purposes. Id. at 49. For our purposes, is an option "non-
income producing" prior to vesting, or only after exercise, or after exercise and
maturity, or after exercise and maturity and when it is under water, or after
exercise and maturity and if it is above water and the grantee declines to sell the
underlying stock? Or, can we take a broader view and say that an employee who
receives stock options by way of compensation is using his labor on a non-income-
producing basis? Or, if he receives other forms of compensation beyond the op-
tions, is his labor capacity merely performing poorly? Of course, with hindsight,
we may know that the performance actually was good. The problem is that we
are called upon to judge the performance of the grant based upon the deferral of
an uncertain benefit. This is fundamentally an impossible task. Accordingly, us-
ing the degree of performance as a trigger for the imputation of income would
seem to be undesirable. However, imputing income based on the value that could
actually be extracted from the options where this isn't being done seems less ob-
jectionable. Here the timing of the imputation of the income and the amount to
be imputed can be derived directly from the grant itself. The Vermont scheme
identifies a trigger, the failure to produce income, and then specifies an amount
to be imputed where the nonperforming assets have a market value in excess of
$10,000, namely the current rate of return on long-term treasury bills. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15 § 653 (5)(A)(I) (2003). This amount may not come close to reflecting
the value in the option holdings, although it might be seen as a reasonable com-
promise between extracting some benefit, while leaving the grantee with the abil-
ity to perform a residual risk/reward calculation. Clark, 779 A.2d at 51, 54
(Johnson J., dissenting). Of course, this might suggest that even in the absence
of statutory standard it is inappropriate to impute the "full" value in the option to
the holder. In this case the dissent wished to adopt the AL standards where
there are underperforming assets and generate a presumption that imputed in-
come to the obligor unless the obligor could demonstrate that the purpose of in-
vesting in the assets was to benefit the children. The level of imputation also
would be according to the ALI proposals, namely, the prevailing rate of return for
secure investments. Id. at 53-4. Finally, the dissent in Clark felt that the con-
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willingness to consider portfolio strategies apparently can be applied
in reverse. At least one court has refused to allow the obligor to assert
that the exercise of his options and investing the proceeds in other
investments while not substantially increasing his standard of living,
was an attempt to diversify his portfolio such as would justify preclud-
ing consideration of the option proceeds as income.164
D. Value and "Income"
If an option is exercised and the resulting underlying stock sold the
revenue extracted from the option is readily determinable. Accord-
ingly, some courts defer the point in time for including options in the
income calculation until these conditions have been satisfied.16 5
Whether or not it is appropriate to allocate the net benefit in its en-
tirety to a given income year is a matter we shall return to. But, if the
options are not exercised and the underlying stock sold, we still need
to establish some value for the options that can be treated as income.
In particular, this need becomes acute where the jurisdiction takes the
position that income should be imputed to the option holder by virtue
of the holder's failure to realize benefits from options that are exercis-
able. 16 6 The cases recognize a variety of methods for establishing the
value. Interestingly, one of the earliest cases to tackle the issue took
the view that as long as the market value of the underlying stock was
below the option exercise price, the option had "no tangible value".16 7
As the Black-Scholes valuation method recognizes, in terms of option
theory itself this case's position technically is incorrect due to the fact
that the option embodies the right to exercise the option during the
time the grant still remains open and during this time the stock price
may rise above the exercise price. This potential has a value. But,
unless the options themselves are publicly traded, the value may be
difficult to ascertain, and it may suit the court's interest in simplicity
and economy to treat an "under water" option as having no value. The
good news would be that the court has adopted an absolute standard,
struction adopted by the court led to a disparity of treatment between wage earn-
ers for whom income could be imputed and asset holders where income would not
be imputed. Id. at 56. An option grantee could readily be characterized as falling
into either camp, or perhaps even into both. Indeed, perhaps the grantee is a
wage earner until the grant is exercised and the underlying stock can be sold and
thereafter the grantee should be viewed as an investor. This shifting characteri-
zation might permit a shifting treatment.
164. Ayyad v. Rashid (In re Marriage of Ayyad), 38 P.3d 1033, 1035, 1037 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2002).
165. As was done in In re Marriage of Campbell, 905 P.2d 19, 20-21 (Colo. Ct. App.
1995). This approach also was attempted by the trial court in Robinson v. Thiel
(In re Marriage of Robinson), 35 P.3d 89, 94 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). These efforts
were overturned on appeal in favor of an imputed income approach.
166. See Robinson, 35 P.3d at 94.
167. Yost v. Unanue, 671 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).
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the bad news is that the standard is wrong, at least as to the concept
of the option's "value." However, if the issue is one of time specific
"income" and the obligor holds exercisable but "under water" options,
then to say that the option grantee has no income probably is correct.
Some courts decline to decide that any particular method of valu-
ing options is appropriate. One court took the position that which
method was appropriate would depend on factors like "the nature of
the stock options, market conditions, tax consequences, ease of appli-
cation, and other facts and circumstances peculiar to each case."168
This hardly seems to be a standard which advances the goals of cer-
tainty, consistency, efficiency, and stability of the income determina-
tion process. After all, even if these factors are relevant to the method
of valuing the options, there is no indication of their significance, rela-
tive or otherwise, in determining the method to be used, beyond giving
the court that articulates a concern for these factors a shelter for the
method it actually employs. Could it be that the generalizations are
no more than an effort to avoid having to come to grips with the com-
plex jurisprudence that necessarily is required to deal with options in
the child support context? The issue gets left for another court at a
later time. As with a butterfly straddle, the piper may have to be
paid, just not now.
Other courts rely on a variety of other techniques to try to resolve
the issue. First, there is the possibility of not identifying income until
the options are liquidated. 169 Or the intrinsic value is used, localizing
the underlying stock price to the "most recent date on which an option
could be exercised." 170 Or, one might use a "net present value
method," that is one of the empirical or theoretical methods such as
the Black-Scholes technique described earlier.'17 But, in this respect,
no judicial consensus seems to have emerged, or even started to
emerge, as to a preferred technique. Certainly, at least one court
sought to "question the practicality of these models for determining a
parent's child support obligation."172 This court went on to leave it up
to a lower court to consider wether the use of the intrinsic valuation
method might be appropriate, based on the "facts and circum-
stances." 73 This is not the most useful of appellate guidance.
Once the court has settled on the amount that is to be attributed to
the option grant, it has to come to grips with the fact that, as we saw,
this amount might be attributable to the grantee's labors over a signif-
168. Robinson, 35 P.3d at 95.
169. As the trial court attempted to do in Robinson, 35 P.3d at 94.
170. As was the case in Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 298 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
For a criticism of this case, see Karns & Hunt, supra note 77, at 259-63.
171. Discussed, but rejected, in Robinson, 35 P.3d at 95.
172. Robinson, 35 P.3d at 95.
173. Id.
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icant period of time, often longer than the time frame the guidelines
require to be considered in determining the obligor's income for use in
the guideline formula. This issue will be dealt with next.
E. Annualizing the "Income"
A feature of options is that after a number of years of holding the
grant, the grantee is in a position to cash out the options and generate
funds at one particular moment in time. The question then arises as
to whether it is "appropriate to allocate some of those proceeds to
other periods besides the year of receipt,"174 or to put it another way,
do we need to "annualize" the income? 175 Of course, we could ignore
this issue entirely, as has been done.17 6 Or, the jurisdiction might
conclude, after due consideration, that an approach based on some
sort of averaging is inappropriate.17 7
If it is appropriate to annualize, how should we go about doing so?
To start with, the parties might agree to annualizing.178 If so, care
should also be taken to stipulate the technique to be employed. In the
absence of such a stipulation, the trial court would have a number of
possible approaches available to it.179 Thus, the court the court could
look backward and spread the earnings over the entire period of em-
ployment, or over the time between vesting and exercise or over the
time between grant and vesting.'8 0 Or the court could look forward,
174. See Cheriton v. Cheriton (In re Marriage of Cheriton), 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 770
n.11 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
175. See Robinson, 35 P.3d at 95 (where Arizona's statute required that "fluctuating"
income had to be annualized and that this would cover option-derived income).
176. As apparently was done by the court in Mackinley v. Messerschmidt, 814 A.2d
680, 683 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). The court was willing to impute the entire
income resulting from the notional exercise of options and sale of the resulting
stock, even though the options had taken a period of time to vest.
177. As has New Hampshire. See In re Feddersen, 816 A.2d 1033, 1037-38 (N.H.
2003).
178. As in Maciejewski v. Maciejewski (In re Marriage of Maciejewski), No. D037304,
2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3478, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2002).
179. In some cases it is not possible from the reports to determine on what theory the
trial court acted. Thus, in Coleman v. Coleman, Nos. 229976 & 230995, 2002
Mich. App. LEXIS 1720, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2002), the trial court
spread the income generated by exercising the options and selling the underlying
stock over a two year period. Why this time frame was picked is not clear. The
situation is made even more confusing because the grantee "usually" was
awarded options each year, but it is not clear from the report whether the options
exercised were received in any given year, over a period of two years, or over a
longer period of employment.
180. See Maciejewski, No. D037304, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3478, *21 (Cal. Ct.
App. February 28, 2002). Another possibility not mentioned specifically by the
court would be the time between the grant and exercise. In this case, the selec-
tion of the time period as being the entire period of employment was held not to
be an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the court took the view that even if the
parties had not agreed to the annualizing of the income, the trial court would
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and spread the income over the period between the petition for sup-
port and the child attaining majority.181
An Arizona Court of Appeal took the position that a trial court
would have a discretion to adopt whatever technique "works best
under the facts and circumstances of each case",15 2 thus postponing
indefinitely a resolution of the underlying issue, and thus, continuing
the metaphor in the title, allowing the butterfly to flutter once more.
However, the court did find it acceptable for the trial court to make a
prospective order requiring the option holder to turn over a predeter-
mined percentage of the actual or presumably imputed income attrib-
utable to the options. 183 No indication was given as to how that
percentage was to be determined and the clear acceptability of the
technique was further undermined by requiring that the percentage
not yield a result that was beyond the needs of the child as determined
by the parents' abilities and standard of living. 184 Other courts have
have had the discretion to annualize anyway. Id. at *23. This case highlighted
another issue which could impact the issue of annualizing and indeed all other
aspects of the consideration of options in fixing child support. The court accepted
that "California child support law now resembles determinate sentencing in the
criminal law: The actual calculation... has been made so complicated .... that,
to conserve judicial resources, any error must be brought to the trial court's at-
tention . . ." Id. at *16 (citing Whealon v. Whealon (In re Marriage of Whealon),
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 559, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
In a Colorado case dealing with a one-time capital gain rather than options,
the trial court had proposed spreading the gain out over the anticipated lifetime
of the recipient. See In re Marriage of Zisch, 967 P.2d 199, 201-02 (Colo. Ct. App.
1998). The appeal court felt that it had to be allocated entirely to the year in
which it was received. Id. The concurring opinion was concerned that spreading
the income over the life of the recipient would have put some of the "income" into
the time of the children's majority, but at the same time the judge was concerned
that another possibility, which was distributing the income over the children's
minority, would lead to arbitrary and irrational results. Id. at 205 (Taubman J.,
concurring). This problem can be avoided by adopting an approach which concep-
tually seems to be the better view anyway, namely, linking the annualizing pro-
cess to the period over which the income was, or would be "earned" rather than
the period over which it would be "spent." This judge also would have allocated
the gain to the specific month in which it was earned, apparently in the belief
that the process of determining an annual income would be based on a calendar
year, thus arbitrarily impacting the amount of income available. Id.
181. See Riley v. Foley, 783 A.2d 807, 813 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (dismissing the issue
on technical grounds).
182. See Robinson v. Thiel, 35 P.3d 89, 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
183. This approach was accepted in Yost v. Unanue, 671 N.E.2d 1374, 1377-78 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1996). The courts see the advantage of a percentage-based award as
being one of judicial economy. Potentially limitless future hearings otherwise
would involve detailed analysis of issues such as income, expenses, investment
successes and failures, tax considerations and issues of fairness. See Kerr v. Kerr
(In re Marriage of Kerr), 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
184. See Robinson v. Thiel, 35 P.3d 89, 96 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). This court followed
the approach of the court in Kerr, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 380-81. In this case the
underlying stock had appreciated twentyfold and the enormous appreciation in
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objected to the use of a percentage based award structure since it ef-
fectively allows the obligor to manipulate his or her own support obli-
gation which has the potential to lead to conflict and litigation.
Additionally, a definite amount enables the obligor to plan and readily
enables the court to determine whether the obligor is in
compliance.185
An Ohio appellate court devised a method for dealing with the
problems just described. The trial court adopted a technique which
valued the price of the underlying stock on a particular date, sub-
tracted from this the exercise price of the option, and divided the re-
sult by the number of months that the option had been open and
multiplied the result by twelve to produce an average annual deferred
income. 186 This was the jurisdiction's approach for dealing with over-
time and bonuses. The appellate court objected to the fact that the
method had no standard technique for determining the date on which
the underlying stock was to be valued. This hiatus undermined the
value of the underlying stock led a percentage based order to generate a child
support award that apparently was beyond the child's requirements in terms of
maintaining the child's standard of living. But care is in order. In California, if
the non-residential parent's standard of living improves after the marriage, the
child is entitled to participate in that improvement, see id. at 377 (citing In re
Marriage of Catalano, 251 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1988) and so needs would be assessed
on that basis rather than on a pre-divorce standard of living. Indeed, In re Mar-
riage of Palin, No. B146259, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4318, at *35 (Cal. Ct.
App., Jan. 31, 2002), accepted the Kerr position as being that a minor child has
the right to be maintained in a lifestyle consistent with the parent's position in
society after the dissolution of the marriage. Presumably, the spill-over effect of
the enhanced order to the benefit of the residential parent is unavoidable, unless
the enhancement can directed to a uniquely child specific advantage such as cur-
rent education or a trust for future use, such as higher education. In any event,
one California court pointed out that great disparities in living standards be-
tween the parents will be noticed by the children who will discern any resulting
unfairness. See Ostler v. Ostler (In re Marriage of Ostler), 272 Cal. Rptr. 560,
573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). This sort of analysis suggests that the proposition that
the child should enjoy the lifestyle he would have had if the parents had not
separated should not be taken too literally. See Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d
772, 775 (Ga. 1997); Hansel v. Hansel, 2000-1914 (La. App. 4 Cir. 11/21/01). It
may be comforting for obligors to note that at least one court seems to have ac-
cepted that the child is not entitled to a lifestyle more lavish than its parents. See
Ayyad v. Rashid, 38 P.3d 1033, 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). And at least one
court acknowledged the "spill-over" effect directly. Setting the child support
above the maximum specifically provided for in the guidelines, but permitted as
an exercise of discretion by the trial court, was justified, in part, because the
increase was offset by a lowering of spousal maintenance, albeit, not in the
amount of the increase. Nolan v. Nolan, No. 42247-2-I, 1999 Wash App. LEXIS
1524, at *16-17 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 1999).
185. See Stacey v. Stacey, No . 02A01-9802-cv-00050, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668, at
*13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1999); Smith v. Smith, No.01-A-01-9705-CH-00216,
1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 733, at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1997).
186. Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 296-97 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
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goal of using the most accurate and equitable method of valuation pos-
sible. The appellate court then went on to reject standard financial
models for valuing options, even though used in the marketplace, be-
cause they are "designed to reflect market forces under certain condi-
tions and may not be reliable for purposes of litigation.' 8 7 Instead,
the court decided that the most important dates as far as the grantee
is concerned would be the grant date and the date that the option first
became exercisable. Accordingly, the income that would be attributed
to the option holder would be the appreciation in value of the underly-
ing stock between the grant date and the exercise date, or, if the op-
tion had not been granted in the year immediately preceding the
determination, then the "income" would be the appreciation in the un-
derlying stock between the anniversary of the grant date in the pre-
ceding year and the anniversary of the exercise date in the year for
which the support obligation was being determined. All this analysis
was to occur with respect to options which were exercisable, because
the premise of the method of imputing the income was that the
grantee had made an investment choice not to exercise the option.' 8 8
In contrast, a Tennessee court felt that the income to be included in
the guideline formula could be obtained by the simple technique of
averaging the gross income received from options in prior years.' 8 9
Indeed, another Tennessee court specifically concluded that it would
be inappropriate to average the option generated income over the
standard period employed in the averaging of bonuses and commis-
sions for support purposes. Instead, it thought that it might be equi-
table to average the income over the entire period that options were
being accumulated, or to "prorate [the income] in some way".190
187. Murray, 716 N.E.2d at 298. The court specifically associated itself with the re-
marks of a trial court in Chammah v. Chammah, No. FA-95145944S, 1997 Conn.
Super LEXIS 1896, at *14-15 (Conn. Super. Ct., July 11, 1997), which found that
the Black-Scholes method did not appear to be an accurate means of"evaluating
employment issued stock options in a marital context."
188. Murray, 716 N.E.2d at 298-99.
189. Stacey v. Stacey, No. 02A01-9802-cv-00050, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668, *12-14
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1999). Regulations in Tennessee specifically require that
for guideline purposes "variable income" be averaged. Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs.
R.. 1240-2-4-.03(3)(b).
190. Smith v. Smith, No. 01-A-01-9705-CH-00216, 1997 Tenn. App. LEXIS 733, at *8
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 1997). While regulations in Tennessee require the aver-
aging of variable income, the regulations do not specify how this averaging is to
be conducted. Instead, apparently, a case by case approach is sanctioned with
the courts trying to average variable income "over as long a period as circum-
stances permit." See Norman v. Norman, No. M2001-02796-COA-R3-CV, 2003
Tenn. App. LEXIS 182, at *30 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2003). In some courts the
rationale behind the averaging process is more than somewhat obscure. In
Meideiros v. Medeiros, No. 20218, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 355, at *2, *4 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Oct. 10, 2000), the court averaged the income over a four year period - why this
period was picked is not clear. Then after having assigned a weighting to each
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Clearly, this is not guidance that would be particularly helpful to trial
courts, especially when encountering a set of staggered grants with
staggered vesting and exercise dates, or, indeed, in most other circum-
stances.1 9 1 The primary beneficiary of the analysis in the short term
was the appellate court, deferring a definitive decision on the annual-
izing process to some point in the future - if ever. After all, there is
potentially no limit on the number of jurisprudential butterfly strad-
dles that could be performed.
Finally, not to leave a stone unturned, it is possible that funds
flowing from the exercise of options may in turn themselves produce
income (or be deemed to do so) and this income also may have to be
taken into account in determining the extent of any child support obli-
gation. 19 2 Presumably, this income should be annualized as well.
But, there does seem to be a limit to fiction. However, so far, no court
seems to have imputed income to the sum notionally arising from the
imputed exercise of options.
F. Obligations Beyond Income
Virtually every state accepts that actual income should be used to
determine a support obligation. But, for our purposes, it is relevant to
note that a significant number of states are willing to determine an
obligation through a process which involves a consideration of the in-
dividual's "wealth," "lifestyle," or "standard of living." The question
year's income and calculating a weighted average income for each of the four
years, it, either deliberately or by oversight, used the un-weighted average to
calculate the support obligation. To add further to the obscurity of the situation,
no rationale for the weighting structure was provided.
191. A subsequent appeal did reveal that the burden is on the party alleging a specific
grant structure to prove it in a timely fashion. Smith v. Smith, No. 01-A-01-9809-
CH-00515, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 510, at *5-9 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 29, 1999).
192. See W. Virginia ex rel Dept. Of Heath & Human Res. v. Baker, 557 S. E.2d 267,
272 (W. Va. 2001); Williams v. Williams, 485 S.E.2d 772, 775 (Ga. 1997). In a
case involving a one-time capital gain, not options, a Colorado court held that the
after tax proceeds could be considered to be an asset to which a "reasonable" rate
of return by way of income could be imputed. See In re Marriage of Zisch, 967
P.2d 199, 202 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). We could end up with a situation where the
court is directed by statute to take into account the tax consequences of any prop-
erty division order, then presumably does so, but fails to direct that each party is
responsible for the tax liability for the options he or she receives, so that the
grantee retains the tax liability for the entire grant, see Rinner v. Rinner, No.
M2001-02307-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 101, at *22-23 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Feb. 6, 2003), and still is liable to have income imputed to him or her on the
basis of any options retained, either on a before or after tax basis, depending on
how any given state guideline approaches the issue. In another permutation on
this theme, a court has acknowledged the tax consequences to one party and de-
clined to take them into account with respect to the other party. This was justi-
fied according to the appellate court because of the first party's "immediate
receipt" of the options. See Watters v. Watters, 959 S.W.2d 585, 590-91 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1997). It is not clear what makes the distinction tenable.
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for us is the extent to which it is appropriate to do so by virtue of the
option holdings of the obligor. 193 At the outset, it is worth clarifying
the distinction between saying that by virtue of option holdings the
obligor has the resources to meet an otherwise determined child sup-
port obligation, and using the existence of those holdings in and of
themselves to determine the extent of the obligation. 19 4 We are con-
cerned with the latter case.
As a preliminary point, we need to recognize that some analytical
tension is produced because of the fact that ordinarily a child support
obligation is premised on the obligor's income and the child's needs. 195
Obviously, it is quite possible for the needs to outstrip the income, and
the issue then is to what extent it is permissible to turn to the capital
resources of the obligor to meet the "needs." In the context of support
guidelines, the argument can lead to a circular analysis since the
guidelines essentially assume a "need" based on available income.
But, if actual "income" isn't available the system has to generate some
artificial construct which justifies extending the analysis to reach the
capital assets of the obligor. This can occur in contexts where the obli-
gor's income is low and resources are relatively few. Here, the 'total
wealth" of the obligor (as well as the ability and willingness to work)
may be considered to justify using capital in lieu of actual income.196
Thus, in an Ohio case, the court allowed an upward departure from
the amount provided for in the guidelines after considering the rela-
tive financial resources and assets of the parties and noting that the
obligor received yearly bonuses and stock options. 197 The court justi-
fied the departure on the construct that the residential parent's in-
come, where her household included four children, would be about
two-thirds of the income of the obligor after the guideline-dictated
amount had been deducted.198 There was no justification on the basis
of "need," although in abstract such an argument could have been
made. The underlying problem is that the guidelines failed to recog-
nize any such "need" because of the apparent antecedent exclusion of
the stock options from the category of "income." Obviously, even at
lesser levels of income, this type of approach opens up the possibility
of "inappropriate" post-divorce wealth transfer.
193. See, e.g., Ayyad v. Rashid (In re Marriage of Ayyad), 38 P.3d 1033, 1035 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2002).
194. See In re Marriage of Cheriton, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755, 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
195. Quaid v. Quaid (In re Marriage of Quaid), 403 N.W.2d 904, 906 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
196. Id. at 907
197. In re Schreiber Children, No. CA2000-04-068, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5773, at *5
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2000).
198. Id. The relative incomes were $18,670 and $27,095.
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The issue also arises at the other end of the income spectrum. 199
Option holdings can be used in two distinct ways. First, the holder is
determined to be say, "wealthy," or some similar classification, by vir-
tue of a value assigned to his or her holdings, by one technique or
another. This classification is then used to justify a support obligation
flowing from application of the guidelines in a way which produces a
support obligation, which on its face seems inordinately large, espe-
cially relative to a first blush evaluation of the child's needs. 2 00 Thus,
for example, the rules may require that in determining the support
obligation, where the parents' combined incomes exceeds an amount
tabulated in the guidelines, the same (or even a larger)20 1 percentage
as was used for the maximum guideline income amount should con-
tinue to be used for any higher amount of actual income. 2 02 This ap-
proach could produce an inordinately high award. Of course the
jurisdiction might permit a departure from the analysis produced re-
sult if that result could be shown to be "unjust, inappropriate, or not in
the child's best interest."20 3 A variation on this approach allows the
income to generate an obligation based on a percentage allocation for
child support, but then allows the court to make a downward devia-
tion if the obligor's income exceeds a specified amount, such that a
downward adjusted order would still provide a reasonable amount of
support based on the best interest of the child and the circumstances
of the parties.20 4
199. For a compilation of the relevant statutory provisions, see Laura W. Morgan,
Child Support in High Income Cases A State-by-State Survey (Feb. 2003), availa-
ble at http://supportguidelines.com/articles/art200302.html.
200. "Needs" as used in child support determinations occurs with tantalizing ambigu-
ity. On the one hand, it can be used to cover the child's reasonable expenses. On
the other it can reflect a child's claims to the lifestyle potential of a wealthy par-
ent. See Cheriton v. Cheriton (In re Marriage of Cheriton), 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 755,
776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). This 'lifestyle" may include a parent who stays at home,
even if a nanny is available. See Hansel v. Hansel, 802 So. 2d 875, 880-1 (La. Ct.
App. 2001). This in turn provides a mechanism for sheltering the residential par-
ent from the possible imputation of income due to unemployment or underem-
ployment. The concept of 'need" may be critical to the analysis. Thus, Texas
precludes the obligor from being required to pay more than the maximum pre-
sumptive amount specified by the guidelines unless an additional amount is re-
quired to meet the 'proven needs" of the child. See In the Interest of C. J., No. 05-
98-01973-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 3067, *9-10 (Tex. Ct. App. May 10, 2001).
201. See Duguay v. Paoletti, 718 N.Y.S.2d 493, 496 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
202. Some jurisdictions allow the guidelines to be employed up to the maximum
amount of combined family income tabulated and then require any additional
support sought on the basis of 'excess" income to be evaluated using the underly-
ing statutory considerations. See Pascale v. Pascale, 644 A.2d 638, 644 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
203. See Murray v. Murray, 716 N.E.2d 288, 295-96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999).
204. Stacey v. Stacey, No. 02A01-9802-CV-00050, 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 668, at *16
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1999).
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There is evidence that jurisdictions have started to have second
thoughts about a structural preference in favor of open-ended commit-
ment to high levels of child support. Thus, Tennessee used to have a
system which required the obligor to prove that an order in excess of
the maximum specified in the guidelines "was not reasonably neces-
sary to provide for the needs of the child". This has been replaced by a
requirement that the burden is now on the claimant to establish that
the excess support is "reasonably necessary " to provide for those
needs. 20 5
Some jurisdictions may be more open-ended in their approach.
Thus, at "high income levels" they may conclude that the best ap-
proach is to leave the level of support to judicial discretion, perhaps
subject to, as in Maryland,20 6 a floor award of the highest amount pro-
vided for in the guidelines, unless going below this floor can be specifi-
cally justified. However, in this case and in the others just described,
it is in the nature of guidelines to create a rebuttable presumption of
appropriateness. 20 7 Effectively, the process can be seen as one which
involves the quasi-imputation of need starting with a premise of lifes-
tyle, or wealth, except that the lifestyle itself may be imputed. 208 Not
infrequently, this process then is combined with one which involves
the actual imputation of income.
V. THE CASES AND THE ALI PERSPECTIVE
The cases for the most part suggest that no center of gravity has
developed as to how options should be dealt with. True, most of the
cases seem to accept the principle that income from whatever source
should be reached to determine and satisfy a child support obligation.
After all, as we saw, there are important interests at stake. Thus,
'finding" income in options certainly enables a court to advance the
interests of the child and the residential parent. The risks associated
205. See Rinner v. Rinner, No. M2001-02307-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS
101, at *15 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2003).
206. See Otley v. Otley, 810 A.2d 1, 13-14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); see also Hill v.
Hill, No. FA980331783S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 490 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb.
21, 2003). In this case, the court increased the support order beyond the pre-
sumptive minimum, but gave no reasons for doing so.
207. Murray, 716 N.E.2d at 296.
208. See Cheriton v. Cheriton (In re Marriage of Cheriton), 111 Cal. Rptr. 755, 772
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Here the court actually assembled both lines of analysis.
Id. at 770-72. The court was faced with an obligor who "live[d] rather modestly,
maintaining a standard of living far below his means." The court said that the
obligation should be determined on the basis of the obligor's resources, not his
lifestyle, because it was appropriate for the children to share in the lifestyle of a
high earner even if the obligor actually spent little on "lifestyle" himself. Id. at
772 n.13. The court ended up by concluding that the obligor's wealth could be
considered even though there was no California authority that expressly man-
dated consideration of the parent's assets in awarding child support. Id. at 772.
[Vol. 82:9471002
SPECULATING ON STOCK OPTIONS
with the process, for the most part, seem to fall on the non-residential
obligor. The fact is that we are operating in an arena where it is de-
batable as to whether there is indeed "income." And, even if one ac-
cepts the income's existence, the analysis almost inevitably confronts
uncertainty as to the amount of income, either in terms of gross
amounts, or current availability, or simply as to the particular sum
that it is appropriate to inject into a guideline formula for the purpose
of determining the actual obligation. Where this uncertainty operates
disadvantageously towards the obligor, it tends to undermine the
Principles' interest in seeing that one parent does not carry a dispro-
portionate share of the burden. It also tends to expose the boundary
between meeting a child's legitimate needs and unwarranted wealth
transfer between households. As to the former, enhanced "income"
identification tends to promote the Principle's goal of ensuring that
post-divorce the child does not miss out on "life opportunities." But,
given that the Principles provide no safe harbor as to the sweep of the
concept, in the absence of a principled analysis of what the options
legitimately can be called upon to provide, the burden of risk exposure
rests on the obligor. On the issue of wealth transfer, the Principles
accept that the obligor owes no duty to the residential household as
such, and in particular avows no objective to equalize the household's
standard of living. However, given the Principles' view that the child
should not be called upon to live a lifestyle grossly inferior to that of
the obligor, as well as not being denied "opportunities", and given that
both of these elements embody no specific benchmarks, there is signif-
icant potential for the erosion of the Principles' interests and goals in
the face of a "fluid" approach to income determination. As was pointed
out, particularly in the presence of substantial resources, the cases are
operating on the boundary between economic necessity and the trial
court's vison of social acceptability, generally subject only to an abuse
of discretion standard. This is not a scenario calculated to bring com-
fort to the option holding obligors of world.
The Principles encourage courts to recognize income from all
sources, leading the net to encompass options. Nevertheless, this pro-
cess drives the courts to grapple with a financial instrument without
ever fully coming to terms with the inherent complexities of options.
In this regard, the Principles devote some attention to the issue of the
imputation of income. When it comes to the residential parent the
goal is to ensure that residential parent-child relationship, as such, is
not subordinated to the pressure to produce income. Supposedly, this
advances the child's interests, which is a proposition that is not rebut-
table. In the absence of the economic quantifiability of the value of the
relationship, alternate visions of what advances the child's interests
cannot be promoted. The Principles suggest another approach with
respect to the non-residential parent. Here, they seem to accept that
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the advantages of one economic vision of the child's interests can be
evaluated against another. In contrast the option cases tend to take
another tack. It is mostly in vain that obligor's attempt to assert that
maintaining a position in options, as distinct from recognizing income,
will advance the child's interests relatively. This argument is simply
overwhelmed by a need to identify "income," a concern with self-deal-
ing on the part of the obligor, and, it seems likely, by a fundamental
lack of understanding of the character of options. The burdens of er-
ratic grant structures, inappropriate valuation, a confusion between
value and income and associated issues of liquidity, or lack thereof,
all tend to be deposited at the door of the obligor, except in rare cases
where this path is foreclosed by statute. Virtually everywhere the la-
bor inherent in achieving equity, fairness and just outcomes tend to be
displaced in favor of the efficiency of simplicity. Of course, this is the
extract of relatively few reported, mostly appellate, cases which reflect
any form of detailed analysis. It can only be left to the imagination
whether highly informed legal representatives are inducing equally
informed busy trial courts (mostly unguided by detailed principled
analysis at the appellate level) to do any better.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the ordinary course, the broad sweep of not necessarily consis-
tent interests to be acknowledged and objectives to be achieved within
the process of awarding child support make that process intrinsically
problematic. But, when this process requires the identification and
extraction of funds from stock options in an amount that might be con-
sidered appropriate and fair relative to those interests and objectives,
the nature of options can elevate the complexity of the task to a level
that is almost overwhelming.
There is evidence that courts faced with the prospect making a
technically sound evaluation of options in the context of awarding
child support routinely opt for simple and immediately pragmatic so-
lutions. Certainly, little effort is made to fabricate coherent compre-
hensive treatments. Such solutions as are adopted seem calculated to
achieve support orders that are likely to lie on the generous side. As
the title to the Article suggests, it is almost inevitable that they will
produce results that are "long" on income. In part, this seems to be
because many courts fail to extricate the analysis from the realm of
finance so that concepts of income remain hopelessly enmeshed in con-
cepts of value. Few courts seem willing or able to be grab the bull by
the horns and determine in a coherent way how much money actually
would be available, or actually could be available (in the context of
imputed income), and dare one add should be available (when it comes
to issues like standards of living and investment choices). The ab-
sence of sound theoretical underpinnings adds to the problem. It is
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very easy for a child's (and at times it seems the residential house-
hold's) supposed needs to overwhelm any attempt to conceptualize op-
tions as an asset resource. It is true that in many instances (though
not all) options readily may be conceived as income to the obligor.
But, at least in the intact household, the options may not have func-
tioned as such. A lot more stability in the analysis could be achieved if
the court ordering support were required to justify metamorphosing
the options from their role of asset in the household economy to one of
current income used to determine the amount of child support. At the
very least there is ample evidence to suggest that it is inappropriate to
apply child support guideline formulae on a rote basis where it is al-
leged that some of the income is supplied by stock options. As much as
this applies to trial courts, it seems even more compellingly so with
respect to the myriad of jurisdictional administrative and other efforts
to achieve pre-trial settlement, at least where the procedure does not
encompass individuals with a sound understanding of option theory.
Is a coherent treatment likely to evolve? Probably not in a hurry.
There are just too many opportunities for courts, particularly at the
appellate level, to seek to achieve a jurisprudential butterfly straddle.
